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REVISITING THE LICENSE V. SALE 
CONUNDRUM 
Nancy S. Kim*
This Article seeks to answer a question that has become 
increasingly more important as commerce moves from the tangible to the 
intangible—to what extent may a business use a contract to control the 
use of a fully paid product? The characterization of a transaction as a 
license or a sale determines what may be done with a product, who 
controls how the product may be used, and what happens in the event of 
a dispute. The past generation has seen a seismic shift in the way 
businesses distribute their products to consumers. Businesses often 
“license” rather than “sell” their products, and view consumers as 
licensees, rather than owners, of the products they buy. Customers own 
their print copies of books, movies, and music but merely license the same 
content when they purchase it in digital form. The marketplace transition 
from sale to license has far and wide ripple effects affecting a range of 
issues from innovation to the environment. The rapid emergence of the 
Internet of Things adds to the urgency and importance of the question—
are goods licensed or sold? 
The question of whether a digital product is licensed or sold is often 
conflated with the question of whether a product should be licensed or 
sold. The problem lies, in large part, with the well-intentioned but 
misguided turn that contract law has taken away from the intent of the 
parties and toward a narrow vision of efficiency. When it comes to 
commercial transactions, the narrow efficiency view prioritizes quantity 
of completed transactions over quality, ignoring consumer expectations 
and the way in which distrust creates uncertainty in the marketplace. This 
Article proposes a methodology for resolving the license v. sale 
conundrum that promotes a more expansive view of efficiency and brings 
more predictability and fairness to an increasingly muddled area of the 
law.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This Article seeks to answer a question that has become 
increasingly more important as commerce moves from the tangible to 
the intangible—to what extent may a business use a contract to control 
the use of a fully paid product? 
The past twenty years has seen a seismic shift in how businesses 
distribute consumer goods, which may alter long-held expectations of 
property ownership.1 Businesses often “license” rather than “sell” 
their products and view consumers as licensees, rather than owners, of 
the products they buy.2 Customers own their print copies of books, 
movies, and music but merely license the same content when they 
purchase it in digital form. Many products integrate licensed software 
with tangible components and many, if not most, digital products are 
characterized as “licensed, not sold.”3 License agreements restrict 
consumers’ rights to use such goods. Consumers, however, may fail 
to distinguish these licensed goods from those that they own. 
Networked devices and home furnishings—the Internet of Things 
(IOT)—are also likely to be licensed to consumers rather than sold 
outright.4 
The problems raised by the license v. sale dilemma have been the 
subject of recent scholarly concern. Professors Aaron Perzanowski 
and Jason Schultz summarize some of the consequences “for 
 
 1. See generally AARON PERZANOWSKI & JASON SCHULTZ, THE END OF OWNERSHIP: 
PERSONAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 2 (2016) (“[D]igital retailers insist that 
ownership depends on the terms of an end user license agreement . . . . Those terms—negotiated 
by lawyers working for retailers and publishers—determine your rights, not the default entitlements 
of personal property.”); JOSHUA A.T. FAIRFIELD, OWNED: PROPERTY, PRIVACY, AND THE NEW 
DIGITAL SERFDOM 23 (2017) (“[W]hy did the development of online rights start turning the clock 
backward to digital feudalism, rather than continuing the progress of traditional property rights into 
new electronic markets? In short, courts and policymakers have struggled with how to apply 
property law to things they can’t touch.”) 
 2. PERZANOWSKI & SCHULTZ, supra note 1, at 4. 
 3. Id. 
 4. For a comprehensive treatment of the legal and regulatory issues surrounding the IOT, 
including the problem of post-purchase control by businesses, see STACY-ANN ELVY, A 
COMMERCIAL LAW OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY FOR THE INTERNET OF THINGS (forthcoming 
2021). See also Stacy-Ann Elvy, The Hybrid Transactions and the INTERNET of Things: Goods, 
Services, or Software?, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 77, 82 (2017) [hereinafter Elvy, Hybrid 
Transactions] (noting that the existing ambiguity in article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC) regarding hybrid transactions “becomes more pressing in the age of the Internet of Things 
(IOT). Companies are increasingly adopting a software and service centric approach to the 
development and sale of goods”). 
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individuals and society” of shifting away from ownership toward a 
“more conditional, impermanent access” to digital and physical goods: 
So what is at stake when we make these choices? The most 
immediate consequence of nonownership is the long list of 
substantive rights we lose. . . . You can’t resell a product you 
don’t own. You can’t lend it, give it away, or donate it. You 
can’t read, watch, or listen on unapproved devices. You can’t 
modify or repair the devices you use. . . . Nor is the impact 
of the shift from ownership to licensing limited to 
individuals; our educational and cultural institutions are 
dealing with the fallout as well. When a library buys a printed 
book, for example, it can lend it to as many patrons as it 
chooses, without asking the publisher for permission of 
paying additional fees. Library books can remain in 
circulation for decades, serving the needs of hundreds of 
readers. But when libraries acquire ebooks, licensing terms 
and software code often impose hard ceilings on lending.5 
Professor Joshua Fairfield issues an even starker warning, arguing that 
the shift away from ownership will result in a new feudalism: 
We must restore everyday property ownership. If we do not 
take back our ownership rights from software companies and 
overreaching governments, we will become digital peasants, 
only able to use our smart devices, our homes, our cars, and 
even our own software-enabled medical implants purely at 
the whim of others. Like the serfs of feudal Europe who 
lacked rights in the land they worked, without digital 
property rights, we aren’t owners—we’re owned.6 
It is more than the ability to consume and possess that is at stake. It is 
the very ability to create. As Fairfield states, “[p]roperty provides 
resources and tools. . . . to turn a technical legal right into a living 
possibility.”7 The first sale right allows the buyer to transfer 
possession of a good that was the subject of a first sale.8 If, however, 
the good was licensed and not sold, the right of first sale would not 
apply.9 Accordingly, those who own the digital rights to property 
 
 5. PERZANOWSKI & SCHULTZ, supra note 1, at 6. 
 6. FAIRFIELD, supra note 1, at 3. 
 7. Id. at 19. 
 8. Nancy S. Kim, The Software Licensing Dilemma, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1103, 1111. 
 9. Id. 
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would be able to restrict how those who are merely licensees may use 
them. As more goods are licensed and not sold, the goods available to 
use in creative and productive pursuits diminish, further widening the 
gap between the digital haves and have-nots.10 
The license v. sale question also has ramifications for privacy. 
Perzanowski and Schultz warn about the privacy problems associated 
with licensed products, noting that there are laws that restrict access 
to information associated with analog goods, such as the books library 
patrons read or the movies that consumers rent, and make obtaining 
such information burdensome.11 Digital transactions, however, make 
tracking “far easier” and permit “unprecedented surveillance of 
consumer behavior.”12 The ability to tie use of a product with the 
collection of personal information depends upon whether the 
transaction at issue is a license and not a sale.13 Companies that license 
instead of sell goods will continue to have access and control to collect 
information from the use of goods that consumers use in their homes 
and in their cars. This is especially true where the product is 
“tethered,” a term that Aaron Perzanowski, Chris Hoofnagle, and 
Aniket Kesari use to refer to a product that has an “ongoing 
connection” with its seller and that “often renders that good in some 
way dependent on the seller for its ordinary operation. Such products 
present as physical goods but often function as vessels for the delivery 
of services.”14 IOT goods are tethered because their ongoing 
functionality depends upon the seller’s service and constant updates 
and modifications.15 Professor Stacy-Ann Elvy cautions that the IOT 
has the potential to transform the advertisement and 
marketing industry, and the data generated by IOT devices 
could be used to target vulnerable consumers for contracting. 
Goods can be made with a readable element in the packaging, 
which will allow manufacturers to assess, in real time, the 
 
 10. This is not to suggest that the owner of a good acquires all rights to that good. The seller 
would still retain intellectual property rights as discussed in Part III.D. 
 11. PERZANOWSKI & SCHULTZ, supra note 1, at 7. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., The Tethered Economy, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 783, 785 
(2019). 
 15. Id. at 793. 
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types of consumers who are buying and using their 
products.16 
These seismic changes have been taking place in the marketplace with 
relatively little fanfare because, like privacy degradation, they are 
gradual and intangible, involving no physical injuries or out-of-pocket 
losses. Yet, like privacy, a lack of public outcry should not be equated 
with public support or consent; nor does it mean that the changes are 
socially beneficial. Joshua Fairfield warns,  
If we are not cautious, the default rules of property, common 
decency, and constitutional ordering that have been tested by 
millions of people over generations will be discarded in favor 
of a contract written by a corporate attorney in the last few 
years to benefit her client and no one else. That is not going 
to be a pleasant society to live in.17 
I first tackled the license v. sale dilemma a decade ago.18 Since 
then, the rapid proliferation of digital, networked products has raised 
even more questions. Is the consumer restricted to the terms of the 
license? Can he or she resell the device if he or she chooses to switch 
to another brand? What if the device fails—is the consumer permitted 
to seek repairs from unauthorized service providers or modify devices 
to better suit his or her needs? 
The Library of Congress attempted to answer the last question 
regarding repairs when it adopted the Register of Copyright’s 
Recommendation and ruled that the Digital Millennium 
Circumvention Act’s prohibition on circumventing technological 
measures that control access to copyright works (i.e., hacking) did not 
apply to “noninfringing” uses of work, notably the ability to repair a 
broken product.19 By weighing in on the important issue of whether 
consumers could hack digital devices for the purpose of repairing 
them, the Library of Congress sought to resolve a longstanding and 
contentious issue. It was not entirely successful in doing so given that 
at least certain provisions require that the “owner” of the device 
initiate circumvention. For example, a subsection titled “Persons who 
may initiate circumvention” states: 
 
 16. Stacy-Ann Elvy, Contracting in the Age of the Internet of Things: Article 2 of the UCC 
and Beyond, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 839, 841 (2016) [hereinafter Elvy, Internet of Things]. 
 17. FAIRFIELD, supra note 1, at 47. 
 18. See Kim, supra note 8, at 1112. 
 19. 37 C.F.R. § 201.40(a)–(b) (2018). 
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To the extent authorized under paragraph (b) of this section, 
the circumvention of a technological measure that restricts 
wireless telephone handsets or other wireless devices from 
connecting to a wireless telecommunications network may 
be initiated by the owner of any such handset or other device, 
by another person at the direction of the owner, or by a 
provider of a commercial mobile radio service or a 
commercial mobile data service at the direction of such 
owner or other person, solely in order to enable such owner 
or a family member of such owner to connect to a wireless 
telecommunications network, when such connection is 
authorized by the operator of such network.20 
It is unclear whether a licensee, as opposed to a purchaser, would be 
considered the “owner” of a product. Furthermore, the right to repair 
is limited and may not apply to the range of modifications that a 
consumer may want to make, which may better suit his or her needs 
and which may constitute enhancements and not repairs.21 If licensing, 
rather than selling, becomes the predominant way by which goods are 
transferred in a market economy, what will the future of innovation 
look like if tinkerers are legally prohibited from altering the products 
for which they pay? How will the environment be affected if products 
cannot be reused, repaired or are made for a single user or use only?22 
The marketplace transition from sale to license thus has far and 
wide ripple effects affecting a range of issues from innovation to the 
environment. The rapid emergence of the IOT adds to the urgency and 
importance of the question—are goods licensed or sold? 
Raising the stakes of the license v. sale dilemma even higher is 
the problem of ubiquitous digital terms, what I refer to as “wrap 
contracts,” as a shorthand for the myriad electronic adhesive form 
contracts, such as browsewraps, clickwraps, and hybrid/sign-in 
 
 20. Id. § 201.40(c). 
 21. See Leah Chan Grinvald & Ofer Tur-Sinai, Intellectual Property Law and the Right to 
Repair, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 63, 74 (2019) (proposing a theoretical framework for a right to repair 
that is consistent with intellectual property laws). 
 22. The European Commission adopted a “Right to Repair” as part of its Circular Economy 
Action Plan that aims to make the economy “fit for a green future, strengthen our competitiveness 
while protecting the environment and give new rights to consumers.” This plan is not legislation 
until and unless it is approved by European Union Member States and the European Parliament. 
Changing How We Produce and Consume: New Circular Economy Action Plan Shows the Way to 
a Climate-Neutral, Competitive Economy of Empowered Consumers, EUR. COMM’N (Mar. 11, 
2020), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_420. 
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wraps.23 Many customers are locked out of the devices they thought 
they purchased until they agree to updated terms of services.24 These 
terms may be updated frequently. Professor Lori Andrews describes 
the experience of being locked out of her phone until she agreed to 
Apple’s updated terms of service and being given only the alternative 
of returning the phone (containing her precious photos, texts, and 
music) for a refund if she refused.25 
The problem of ubiquitous terms is exacerbated by the increasing 
use of contracting agents, which removes the consumer from the 
contracting process, resulting in what Stacy-Ann Elvy refers to as 
“Contract Distancing”: 
The device, rather than the consumer, places the order for the 
goods, or the consumer places the order by clicking the Dash 
Button. . . . The consumer is not required to access the 
company’s website or mobile application (which contains 
contract terms), review the company’s terms and conditions, 
or click an “I agree” button before each subsequent order is 
placed. This complicates the analysis of mutual assent, as 
contract terms are not displayed on IOT devices. The ease 
with which goods can be purchased using these devices 
facilitates a contracting environment in which quick 
purchases without contract review are the norm, thereby 
further incentivizing consumers to fail to read and understand 
contract terms. In turn, this encourages businesses to 
continue to take advantage of consumer ignorance by 
including one-sided contract terms that impede the ability of 
consumers to obtain legal redress and may even lead to 
contractual abuse.26 
The United States Supreme Court raised the license v. sale issue 
without resolving it in Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark 
International, Inc.27 (Impression), which held that a patentee’s 
 
 23. I have discussed the problem of wrap contracts at length elsewhere. See NANCY S. KIM, 
WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS 2 (2013). 
 24. See Lori Andrews, The Fragility of Consent, 66 LOY. L. REV. 11, 11 (2020). 
 25. Andrews writes, “Of course, returning the phone was not an option. My photos for the past 
few years were on it, including the pictures of my younger sister before she died. The device also 
housed my phone directory. . . . For me, it was as if someone was holding my possessions hostage, 
asking me to give up basic human rights—like privacy—to get them back.” Id. 
 26. Elvy, Internet of Things, supra note 16, at 843–44. 
 27. 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017). 
(7) 54.1_KIM.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/25/21  5:56 PM 
2020] REVISITING THE LICENSE V. SALE CONUNDRUM 107 
decision to sell a product subject to post-sale contract terms exhausted 
all of its patent rights to that product regardless of whether the sale 
occurred in the United States or abroad.28 The Patent Act grants a 
patentee the “right to exclude others from making, using, offering for 
sale, or selling the invention”29 so that anyone who does so without 
authority infringes the patent.30 However, this right is subject to the 
patent exhaustion doctrine, which limits the patentee’s rights so that 
the first authorized sale of a patented item terminates the patentee’s 
rights with respect to that item.31 The Supreme Court made a clear 
distinction between a license and a sale with respect to post-sale 
restrictions, stating: 
A patentee can impose restrictions on licensees because a 
license does not implicate the same concerns about restraints 
on alienation as a sale. Patent exhaustion reflects the 
principle that, when an item passes into commerce, it should 
not be shaded by a legal cloud on title as it moves through 
the marketplace. But a license is not about passing title to a 
product, it is about changing the contours of the patentee’s 
monopoly: The patentee agrees not to exclude a licensee 
from making or selling the patented invention, expanding the 
club of authorized producers and sellers.32 
The Impression decision answers an important question regarding 
the doctrine of patent exhaustion post-sale but pushes to the forefront 
an equally perplexing and problematic question: Can a patentee 
circumvent the patent exhaustion doctrine by licensing its products 
rather than selling them? This seemingly simple question opens a 
Pandora’s box of other issues relating to the license v. sale conundrum 
because the classification of an item as a sale or license essentially 
dictates the rights and remedies of the parties and determines which 
regime of law governs.33 
 
 28. Id. at 1531. 
 29. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2018). 
 30. Id. § 271(a). 
 31. Impression, 137 S. Ct. at 1531. 
 32. Id. at 1534. 
 33. If the transaction is a sale, article 2 of the UCC, consumer protection laws, and the common 
law of contracts govern the transaction. Although article 2 of the UCC covers transactions in goods, 
relevant provisions of the UCC refer to “sales” or “sellers.” Consumer protection laws typically 
apply to sales or leases of consumer goods. For example, the warranty protection provided under 
the California consumer protection law, the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, applies to the 
“sale of consumer goods.” CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1790–1795.8 (Deering 2020). The Song-Beverly 
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At the heart of the license v. sale conundrum is contract law. The 
characterization of a transaction determines what may be done with 
the product, who controls how the product may be used, and what 
happens in the event of a dispute.34 A contract may contain terms that 
determine how the transaction is characterized. Accordingly, contracts 
have the potential to alter consumer expectations in a profound way. 
For example, if a consumer pays for a television, he or she may expect 
to be able to later resell it or give it away when he or she no longer has 
a use for it. But could a consumer do so if, prior to purchase, he or she 
had agreed to contractual terms that stated that he or she was not the 
owner of the television, but a mere licensee? What if those terms were 
contained in the box that contained the television when the consumer 
purchased it—and never read them? Mass consumer contracting and 
the transfer, or retention, of rights through adhesive forms lack the 
signaling effects of negotiated and signed paper contracts. The 
proliferation of digital contracting, lack of consumer awareness, and 
the adhesive nature of standard form contracts raise important policy 
concerns regarding whether there should be constraints on the ability 
to license, rather than sell, goods in mass consumer transactions. 
Because both the UCC and intellectual property regimes defer to 
the power of contracts to reallocate rights,35 a circularity problem 
arises: if the transaction is a license instead of a sale, the terms of the 
contract govern, including any terms that prohibit selling the product; 
 
Act defines “sale” as “the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price” or “a consignment 
for sale.” Id. § 1791(n)(1)–(2). On the other hand, if the transaction is a license, intellectual property 
law (specifically copyright and patent law) govern. Kim, supra note 8, at 1110–11. For further 
discussion, see Elvy, Hybrid Transactions, supra note 4, at 79, where the author noted that “one of 
the thorniest issues in sale of goods transactions is how best to determine whether Article 2 applies 
to transactions involving the provision of goods and no-goods, such as services or software.” See 
also Kim, supra note 8, at 1110 (stating that the “ramifications of characterizing software 
transactions as either license or sales are manifold” and “has a domino effect on the applicable 
regulatory regime, default rules, and available remedies”); Hoofnagle et al., supra note 14, at 794–
95 (observing that “[s]oftware licensing has blended elements of the sale of goods and the provision 
of services” and “straddle accepted legal categories,” and “courts struggle to conceptualize these 
transactions”). 
 34. Elvy notes that companies may avoid the application of article 2 of the UCC “by providing 
different agreements that govern the device’s hardware, software and services.” Elvy, Hybrid 
Transactions, supra note 4, at 85. 
 35. Section 301 of the Copyright Act preempts a state law claim only if the work is within the 
subject matter of copyright and the right being asserted is equivalent to “any of the exclusive rights 
within the general scope of copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2018); see also Forest Park Pictures v. 
Universal Television Network, Inc., 683 F.3d 424, 430 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that a contract claim 
is not preempted if there is an “extra element” that differs from the copyright infringement claim). 
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however, the contract itself may determine whether the transaction is 
characterized as a license or sale. Owners of tangible property have 
the power to restrict the use of their property, but their power to do so 
is tied to their ownership. Generally, if the transaction is characterized 
as a sale, then the seller’s property rights are terminated. By contrast, 
a license allows the owner of intangible property to retain rights with 
respect to it even if it is integrated with tangible property that has been 
sold. This is the case in an increasing number of transactions that 
cannot be easily characterized as exclusively a license or a sale. Rather 
these license-sale transactions are a hybrid of both; the tangible 
component or medium is sold, but the digital content or intellectual 
property right associated with the product is licensed.36 
This Article argues that the enforceability of contract terms in a 
license-sale transaction depends upon two factors: first, whether the 
terms affect the “sold” portion or the “licensed” portion; and second, 
whether the contract is formed pre- or post-sale. A contract cannot 
recharacterize a sale as a license after the transaction has occurred, but 
it can impose restrictions that may define or characterize that 
transaction if those restrictions are agreed to before the transaction has 
occurred. 
Unfortunately, contract doctrine in the past three decades has 
adopted a narrow version of efficiency that confuses efficiency with 
facilitating transactions and accordingly, substitutes constructive 
assent with constructive notice. But contracts that significantly alter 
the parties’ rights must reflect the intent of the parties. More 
transactions with hidden, unread, and unfair terms are suboptimal, do 
not leave the parties (or society) better off, and cannot be justified by 
any economic theory. A contract that contains terms that purport to 
 
 36. In order to avoid confusion with hybrid transactions under the UCC (where the term is 
used by courts to refer to transactions that involve the sale of goods and services), I will refer to 
transactions that involve the sale of a tangible component with the license of an intangible 
component as a “license-sale” and will eschew the use of the term “hybrid” transaction. See 
generally Elvy, Hybrid Transactions, supra note 4, at 104–35 (providing an extensive discussion 
of hybrid transactions, including whether software constitute goods or services, and the different 
tests employed by courts to determine whether the UCC applies). The determination of whether an 
offering is a “good” or “service” is important for purposes of the UCC; however, this Article 
focuses on the license v. sale conundrum that affects the application of the UCC but also other laws, 
significantly, the first sale doctrine. All transactions involving tethered goods under my definition 
would be considered license-sale transactions, but not all license-sale transactions involve tethered 
goods. Some involve products that involve no ongoing relationship between the buyer and the 
seller, yet the seller purports in a contract to maintain rights to that product. 
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transform what would otherwise be a sale into a license alters the 
buyer’s first sale rights and requires scrutiny, especially when that 
contract is presented as a non-negotiated, mass consumer form.37 
The question of whether a product is licensed or sold is too often 
conflated with the question of whether a product should be licensed or 
sold. The normative question typically arises in assessing the issue of 
infringement; however, the normative question must be disentangled 
from the descriptive question regarding whether a given transaction is 
in fact a license or a sale. This Article proposes a methodology for 
resolving the license v. sale conundrum that promotes a more 
expansive view of efficiency by bringing more clarity and fairness to 
an increasingly muddled area of the law. 
Part II provides essential background and identifies the stakes 
involved in the license v. sale conundrum. Part III analyzes the pivotal 
role of contract law in assessing the nature of post-transaction 
restrictions. Part IV proposes a methodology for assessing whether a 
good is “licensed” or “sold.” This Article concludes that the license v. 
sale conundrum is a problem created by contract law that can be 
resolved by contract law that focuses on the reasonable expectations 
of the parties. 
II.  BACKGROUND: THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
PRODUCTS “LICENSED, NOT SOLD” 
This Part II provides an overview of the current law governing 
the license v. sale dilemma. Generally, the relevant cases addressed 
one or both of the following two issues: (i) whether a post-sale contract 
may restrict first sale rights and (ii) whether contractual language 
characterizes a transaction as a license or a sale. 
A.  A First Sale Exhausts a Patentee’s Rights Despite Post-Sale 
Terms 
In Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.,38 the Supreme 
Court addressed the issue of post-sale restrictions on use and held that 
the doctrine of patent exhaustion applies to method patents and the 
sale of components that embody them.39 In that case, LG Electronics 
(LGE) licensed its patents to Intel pursuant to a License Agreement 
 
 37. See discussion infra Part III. 
 38. 553 U.S. 617 (2008). 
 39. Id. at 621. 
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that permitted “Intel to ‘make, use, sell (directly or indirectly), offer 
to sell, import or otherwise dispose of’ its own products practicing the 
LGE patents.”40 The License Agreement also stated that no license 
was granted to “any third party” for the combination of other 
components with the licensed products.41 Notably, it also stated, 
“[n]otwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this 
Agreement, the parties agree that nothing herein shall in any way limit 
or alter the effect of patent exhaustion that would otherwise apply 
when a party hereto sells any of its Licensed Products.”42 
LGE and Intel signed a separate agreement, the Master 
Agreement, which required that Intel provide written notice to its 
customers that Intel products, which were licensed by LGE, did not 
“extend, expressly or by implication, to any product that you make by 
combining an Intel product with any non-Intel product.”43 The Master 
Agreement also provided that “a breach of this Agreement shall have 
no effect on and shall not be grounds for termination of the Patent 
License.”44 Quanta purchased microprocessors and chips from Intel.45 
Intel had given Quanta the notice required by the Master Agreement, 
but Quanta manufactured computers using Intel components 
combined with non-Intel components.46 It did not alter or modify the 
Intel components but incorporated them into its own systems.47 LGE 
sued Quanta, claiming that its use was infringing upon LGE patents.48 
Patent exhaustion is triggered only by an authorized sale, and LGE 
argued that the sale of the Intel components was not authorized 
because the License Agreement did not permit Intel to sell its products 
for use in combination with non-Intel products in a way that practiced 
the LGE patents.49 The U.S. Supreme Court looked at the structure of 
the transaction to determine whether the sale was “authorized.”50 It 
stated: 
 
 40. Id. at 623. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. (alteration in original). 
 43. Id. at 623–24. 
 44. Id. at 624. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 636. 
 50. Id. at 636–37. 
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Nothing in the License Agreement restricts Intel’s right to 
sell its microprocessors and chipsets to purchasers who 
intend to combine them with non-Intel parts. . . . In any 
event, the provision requiring notice to Quanta appeared only 
in the Master Agreement, and LGE does not suggest that a 
breach of that agreement would constitute a breach of the 
License Agreement. Hence, Intel’s authority to sell its 
products embodying the LGE Patents was not conditioned on 
the notice or on Quanta’s decision to abide by LGE’s 
directions in that notice.51 
 The Court further noted that the disclaimer of a third-party license 
in the License Agreement was “irrelevant” to the issue of exhaustion 
since exhaustion turns on an authorized first sale and not on an implied 
license.52 It concluded that because “[n]o conditions limited Intel’s 
authority to sell products substantially embodying the patents,” its 
sales to Quanta were authorized, which triggered patent exhaustion.53 
Accordingly, LGE could no longer assert its patent rights against 
Quanta.54 
Although the Quanta case involved a negotiated agreement, the 
U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of post-sale terms in an 
adhesive form contract in a later case, Impression. Lexmark, a 
manufacturer of toner cartridges, offered its products at two different 
prices—one at full price and the other at a 20 percent discount through 
its “Return Program.”55 The company required that customers 
purchasing its Return Program cartridges agreed that they would use 
the cartridge only once and would not transfer the empty cartridge to 
any party other than Lexmark.56 In addition, Lexmark installed a 
microchip on each Return Program cartridge to prevent its reuse.57 
Companies, however, soon found ways to circumvent the microchip 
and resell the Return Program cartridges.58 Lexmark sued several of 
 
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. at 637. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Impression, 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1530 (2017). 
 56. Id. at 1529–30. 
 57. Id. at 1530. 
 58. Id. 
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these “remanufacturers” and eventually settled with all but 
Impression.59 
Lexmark argued that Impression infringed Lexmark’s patents 
when Impression refurbished and resold Lexmark’s cartridges in 
express violation of the agreement between Lexmark and its 
customers.60 Impression also acquired cartridges from purchasers 
overseas and imported them into the United States, which Lexmark 
claimed infringed its patent because it had never permitted their 
importation.61 Impression, however, argued that Lexmark’s sales of its 
cartridges exhausted its patent rights so that Impression was free to 
refurbish, resell and—for those cartridges acquired abroad—import 
them.62 
The Supreme Court agreed with Impression, ruling that “a 
patentee’s decision to sell a product exhaust[ed] all of its patent rights 
in that item, regardless of any restrictions the patentee purports to 
impose or the location of the sale.”63 This was the case even if the sale 
had been made by a licensee and not the patentee itself; if the 
licensee’s customers signed a contract agreeing to restrict their use of 
the product, “the sale nonetheless exhausts all patent rights in the item 
sold.”64 The Court alluded to the possibility of a contract remedy in 
that situation, stating that if the purchaser did not comply with the use 
restriction, “the only recourse for the licensee is through contract law, 
just as if the patentee itself sold the item with a restriction.”65 
The Court distinguished another case, General Talking Pictures 
Corp. v. Western Electric Co.,66 which involved a licensee who 
knowingly made sales unauthorized by its license.67 It characterized 
 
 59. Id. (“Eventually, the lawsuit was whittled down to one defendant, Impression Products, 
and one defense: that Lexmark’s sales, both in the United States and abroad, exhausted its patent 
rights in the cartridges, so Impression Products was free to refurbish and resell them, and to import 
them if acquired abroad.”); Michele Korkhov & Anna Marienko, Impression Products v. Lexmark 
International, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/15-1189 (last visited 
Dec. 17, 2020) (“In 2010, Lexmark sued Impression Products and several other re-manufacturers 
for direct and contributory patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271. The only defendant 
remaining in this case is Impression Products.”) 
 60. Impression, 137 S. Ct. at 1530. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 1529. 
 64. Id. at 1535. 
 65. Id. 
 66. 305 U.S. 124 (1938). 
 67. Id. at 126. 
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that case as standing for the “modest principle that, if a patentee has 
not given authority for a licensee to make a sale, that sale cannot 
exhaust the patentee’s rights.”68 The Impression opinion differentiated 
authorized sales from unauthorized ones, noting that, ‘[o]nce a 
patentee decides to sell—whether on its own or through a licensee—
that sale exhausts its patent rights, regardless of any post-sale 
restrictions the patentee purports to impose, either directly or through 
a license.”69 Accordingly, a patentee could not use licenses to impose 
post-sale restraints upon purchasers.70 
The Impression decision clarified that a patentee who sells a 
product could not enforce a contractual reuse or resale restriction with 
an infringement lawsuit. In doing so, the Court rejected a significant 
Federal Circuit court decision, Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart Inc.,71 
which permitted post-sale use restrictions of a patented item.72 In 
Mallinckrodt, the Federal Circuit held that a “single use only” 
restriction was enforceable even after the first sale of the item.73 The 
Supreme Court in Impression stated that the Federal Circuit had “got 
off on the wrong foot” by relying upon Mallinckrodt.74 The Federal 
Circuit believed that the exhaustion doctrine was a presumption about 
the authority of the purchaser to use a patented item; thus, that 
presumption would be inapplicable if the patentee withheld some of 
rights to use the item.75 The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that 
patent exhaustion is “not a presumption about the authority that comes 
along with a sale; it is instead a limit on the ‘scope of the patentee’s 
rights.’”76 
Furthermore, the Court made clear that its analysis applied to 
copyright as well as patent first sale, stating that “differentiating the 
patent exhaustion and copyright first sale doctrines would make little 
theoretical or practical sense: The two share a ‘strong similarity . . . 
and identity of purpose.’”77 The Copyright Act’s first sale doctrine 
 
 68. Impression, 137 S. Ct. at 1535. 
 69. Id. at 1535. 
 70. Id. at 1534–35. 
 71. 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992), abrogated by Impression, 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017). 
 72. Id. at 709. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Impression, 137 S. Ct. at 1533. 
 75. Id. at 1533–34 (citing Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc., 816 F.3d 721, 734, 
742, rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017)). 
 76. Id. at 1534 (quoting United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489 (1926)). 
 77. Id. at 1536 (quoting Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 13 (1913)). 
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permits “the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully 
made . . . without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or 
otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.”78 
The Impression case limits the patentee’s ability to control the 
purchaser’s use of a product post-sale. The Court also clearly indicated 
that the case was not limited to patent first sale, but also applied to 
copyright first sale, thus implicating a much wider swath of goods and 
services.79 
Impression involved a product that was sold and one that did not 
contain licensed components. Significantly, the Supreme Court 
decision applied only to post-sale restrictions. The Supreme Court 
suggested that patent exhaustion may not apply to situations where a 
patented item was distributed pursuant to a license, or where the sale 
was unauthorized, as in General Talking Pictures.80 Consequently, the 
case did not resolve the fundamental question regarding whether (and 
to what extent) owners could use a contract to shape the nature of the 
rights they transferred. The significance and future impact of 
Impression may be greatly limited if a patentee (or copyright holder) 
is permitted to achieve through licensing what it could not through a 
sale. 
Impression was a case about patent exhaustion and international 
sales, so the Supreme Court only glossed over the contract issues. 
Those contract issues were squarely confronted in a different case that 
also involved Lexmark and a contractual prohibition against the reuse 
of cartridge. In Arizona Cartridge Remanufacturers Association Inc. 
v. Lexmark International Inc.,81 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
considered the validity of Lexmark’s “Prebate” program contract.82 
Lexmark required its customers to select one of two types of printer 
cartridges.83 Apparently the only differentiating factor between the 
two was that the Prebate cartridges cost less and contained terms that 
purported to restrict the consumers’ use of the cartridge.84 The 
 
 78. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2018). 
 79. See Impression, 137 S. Ct. at 1536. 
 80. Id. at 1538. See generally Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124 
(1938). 
 81. 421 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 82. Id. at 984–85. The “Prebate” program was later renamed the Return Program. See Lexmark 
Int’l., Inc. v. Ink Tech. Printer Supplies, LLC, No. 1:10-CV-564, 2014 WL 1276133, at *1 (S.D. 
Ohio Mar. 27, 2014), rev’d, 816 F.3d 721 (Fed. Cir. 2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017). 
 83. Arizona Cartridge, 421 F.3d at 983–84. 
 84. Id. 
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customer did not sign an actual contract; rather, the terms were printed 
across the top of the cartridge box so that the customer could not avoid 
seeing them.85 The terms stated that the customer accepted them by 
opening the package; rejecting the terms required returning the 
unopened package to the place of purchase.86 The plaintiffs, who 
remanufactured printer cartridges for reuse, sued Lexmark claiming 
that it engaged in deceptive and unfair business practices when it told 
customers that they had to honor the post-sale restrictions on the 
cartridge package.87 The plaintiffs argued that Lexmark could only 
impose such a restriction with a valid contract, which the Prebate 
contract was not.88 
The Ninth Circuit disagreed and affirmed the lower court’s 
finding of enforceability.89 In addressing the validity of the contract, 
the court cited California Commercial Code, which adopted the UCC 
provision, which permits a contract to be formed “in any manner 
sufficient to show agreement . . . . even though the moment of its 
making is undetermined.”90 Interestingly, in a footnote, the court of 
appeals stated that its holding did not “preclude challenges to the 
contract” which could be raised by a customer who was a party to the 
contract—which the plaintiffs were not.91 
B.  The Nature of the Restrictions Distinguishes a License from a 
Sale 
Perhaps not surprisingly, given the presence of Silicon Valley and 
Hollywood within its jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit has been 
particularly active in hearing cases involving the license v. sale 
quandary in the context of copyright first sale. 
In the first significant Ninth Circuit case on this topic, United 
States v. Wise,92 the defendant operated a business which sold 
copyrighted feature-length motion picture and prints.93 The movie 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 984. 
 88. Id. at 987. 
 89. Id. at 988 (reasoning that consumers “(1) have notice of the condition, (2) have a chance 
to reject the contract on that basis and (3) receive consideration in the form of a reduced price in 
exchange for the limits placed on reuse of the cartridge”). 
 90. CAL. COM. CODE § 2204(1) (Deering 2020). 
 91. Arizona Cartridge, 421 F.3d at 988 n.8. 
 92. 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 93. Id. at 1183. 
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studios that owned the copyright to the films did not sell them but 
licensed their use for limited purposes and for limited periods of time 
to movie theatres, airlines, private groups and members of the motion 
picture industry.94 The license agreements pursuant to which these 
films were distributed generally reserved title in the studios and 
contained restrictions, including their return after the expiration of the 
license period, prohibition on copying of the prints, and, in some 
cases, limiting the print to personal use.95 The court stated that with 
respect to the films that were the subject of the agreements, “[n]one of 
the films had been subject to an outright sale,”96 meaning there was no 
payment in exchange for the films. 
The court noted that before the first sale doctrine could be applied, 
a “transfer of title” must have occurred rather than “mere 
possession.”97 In determining whether the transactions were “sales” 
for purposes of the first sale doctrine, the court considered several 
factors, including their designation as licenses, the purported transfer 
of only limited rights for a limited purpose and period of time, the 
reservation of title in the studio, prohibitions on copying, and the 
requirement of return at the end of the contract term.98 It concluded 
that most of the contracts “were consistent with the theory of a limited 
license and inconsistent with the concept of a sale.”99 The court took 
special note of two agreements with similar provisions. The first 
agreement contained a provision that “Licensor may buy from NBC” 
prints made at a mutually agreed upon price; if no price was reached, 
NBC agreed to destroy the prints.100 It also contained a provision that 
the licensor retained title to the prints.101 The court concluded that the 
agreement indicated that the transaction was a license and not a sale.102 
The court came to a different conclusion with respect to the second 
agreement (that was not labeled as a license) because although it also 
contained a provision regarding the return of prints, it contained no 
provision regarding the retention of title by the licensor.103 More 
 
 94. Id. at 1184. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 1187. 
 98. Id. at 1190–91. 
 99. Id. at 1191. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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importantly, it contained a provision that “[a]t ABC’s election and cost 
a file-screening copy shall be retained.”104 The court found that the 
provision “clearly contemplates the sale of a film print to ABC at 
ABC’s election.”105 Prints that were loaned to actors subject to 
agreements that contained personal use restrictions, prohibited 
copying, and reserved rights to the studio were also considered 
licenses, not sales.106 An exception was an agreement between Warner 
Brothers and the actress, Vanessa Redgrave.107 That agreement 
provided that Redgrave would pay for the print but contained a 
provision that the print was for her “personal use and enjoyment” only, 
must remain in her possession, could not be “sold, leased, licensed or 
loaned,” and could not be reproduced.108 The court stated that while 
the payment provision alone did not establish a sale, together with the 
rest of the agreement, the transaction “strongly” resembled a sale with 
use restrictions.109 
The Ninth Circuit revisited the license v. sale issue in three cases 
often referred to as the “MAI trio,” which involved whether 
customized software was licensed or sold for the purposes of the 
essential step defense under the Copyright Act.110 The essential step 
defense permits the owner of a copy of a software program to make a 
copy of a program as an “essential step in the utilization of the 
computer program” or for “archival purposes.”111 The Ninth Circuit 
distinguished a license from a sale based upon the nature of the 
restrictions imposed by the agreement.112 If the agreement imposed 
significant restrictions, the software was deemed licensed and not 
sold.113 Accordingly, the first sale doctrine did not apply. The MAI trio 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 1192. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2006); Triad Sys. 
Corp. v. Se. Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995); MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Comput., Inc., 991 
F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 111. 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1)–(2) (2018); see also Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119, 122 
(2d Cir. 2005) (noting that an owner may copy software as an essential step in using the program). 
 112. See Wall Data Inc., 447 F.3d at 785; Triad Sys. Corp., 64 F.3d at 1337; MAI Sys. Corp., 
991 F.2d at 517. 
 113. See Wall Data Inc., 447 F.3d at 785; Triad Sys. Corp., 64 F.3d at 1333; MAI Sys. Corp., 
991 F.2d at 517. 
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became the foundation upon which the Ninth Circuit decided a spate 
of subsequent cases in 2010 and 2011. 
In Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc.,114 Vernor purchased used copies of 
Autodesk’s software and resold them on eBay.115 He sought a 
declaratory judgment that by doing so, he was not infringing upon 
Autodesk’s copyright.116 The district court agreed, holding that 
“Vernor’s sales were lawful” under “the first sale doctrine and the 
essential step defense” of the Copyright Act.117 The Ninth Circuit, 
however, disagreed, holding that a software user is a licensee rather 
than the owner of a copy where the copyright owner “(1) specifies that 
the user is granted a license; (2) significantly restricts the user’s ability 
to transfer the software; and (3) imposes notable use restrictions.”118 
In a subsequent case, UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto,119 the 
Ninth Circuit noted the distinction between a transfer of title and 
transfer of possession—and hinted that software may be different from 
other goods.120 That case involved promotional music compact discs 
(CDs) distributed by the music company, UMG.121 The CDs were 
distributed without seeking payment.122 Some of the CDs contained a 
statement indicating that the license was for personal use only, 
prohibiting transfer or resale, and stating that acceptance of the CD 
constituted acceptance of the terms of the “license.”123 Other CDs 
simply contained a “Promotional Use Only—Not for Sale” label.124 
UMG did not send Augusto the CDs, but he managed to acquire them 
and then sold them online.125 UMG sued, alleging copyright 
infringement.126 Augusto argued that the first sale doctrine permitted 
him to sell or transfer the CDs without permission from UMG.127 
UMG argued that the first sale doctrine did not apply because the 
promotional statement meant that the recipients were licensees and not 
 
 114. 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 115. Id. at 1103. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 1111. 
 119. 628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 120. Id. at 1180. 
 121. Id. at 1177. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 1177–78. 
 124. Id. at 1178. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 1179. 
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owners of the CDs.128 The court disagreed, stating that 
“[n]otwithstanding its distinctive name, the [first sale] doctrine applies 
not only when a copy is first sold, but when a copy is given away or 
title is otherwise transferred without the accouterments of a sale.”129 
The court, citing its decisions in Vernor and the MAI trio, noted 
that “[p]articularly with regard to computer software” a transfer of 
possession of a copy did not necessarily entail a transfer of title.130 
However, UMG did not keep track of the CDs and entitled the 
recipients to use or dispose of them as they liked.131 Significantly, 
under 39 U.S.C. § 3009, the CDs were unordered merchandise and the 
recipients had the right to treat them as gifts without any obligation to 
the sender.132 Because the recipients of the CDs could transfer them 
under the federal statute, they were owners and not licensees for 
purposes of the first sale defense.133 According to the court, the effect 
of the unordered merchandise statute distinguished the case from 
Vernor and the MAI trio.134 
The court noted that other factors weighed against finding a 
license. The “Promotional Use Only—Not for Sale” restriction did not 
identify itself as a license.135 Even the longer notice was insufficient 
in the court’s view.136 That version stated as follows: 
This CD is the property of the record company and is 
licensed to the intended recipient for personal use only. 
Acceptance of this CD shall constitute an agreement to 
comply with the terms of the license. Resale or transfer of 
possession is not allowed and may be punishable under 
federal and state laws.137 
Interestingly, the court did not mention another case, MDY 
Industries, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc.,138 which was argued 
 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 1180. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 1180–81. 
 133. Id. at 1181. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 1182. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. 629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2010). Both UMG Recordings and Blizzard were argued and 
submitted on June 7, 2010. 
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on the same day before the Ninth Circuit.139 MDY developed and sold 
a software program that automatically played the early levels of the 
popular role-playing computer game, World of Warcraft (WoW).140 
Citing Vernor, the Ninth Circuit held that WoW players were licensees 
because Blizzard reserved title in the software, granted players a non-
exclusive limited license, and imposed significant transfer and use 
restrictions.141 
Finally, in F.B.T. Productions, LLC v. Aftermath Records,142 the 
Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of whether iTunes downloads were 
licensed or sold.143 In 1998, the parties entered into a contract that 
required F.B.T. to transfer the exclusive rights to the musician 
Eminem’s recordings to Aftermath.144 In a contractual provision that 
the parties referred to as the “Records Sold provision,” the parties 
agreed that Aftermath was to pay F.B.T. 12 to 20 percent of the 
adjusted retail price for all “full price records sold in the United 
States . . . through normal retail channels.”145 Another provision, 
which the parties referred to as the “Masters Licensed” provision, 
stated that “[n]otwithstanding the foregoing,” Aftermath would pay 
F.B.T. “50% of Aftermath’s net receipts ‘[o]n masters licensed by us 
. . . to others for their manufacture and sale of records or for any other 
uses.’”146 In 2002, Aftermath entered into an agreement with Apple, 
which allowed the Eminem masters to be sold as permanent 
downloads through the iTunes store.147 Aftermath entered into other 
contracts with cell phone carriers to sell ringtones.148 After a 2006 
 
 139. See id. at 929; UMG Recordings, Inc., 628 F.3d at 1175. 
 140. Blizzard, 629 F.3d at 934–35. 
 141. For example, if a player transferred the license, the player must transfer all packaging, 
permanently delete the game client, and transfer only to someone willing to accept the end user 
license agreement. The software was only for non-commercial use and Blizzard was able to 
remotely alter the game client and terminate the license in the event the terms were violated. 
Termination of the license required the immediate destruction of all copies of the game and the 
removal of the game client from computers. Id. at 938–39. 
 142. 621 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 143. Id. at 961. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 961. 
 146. Id. (alterations in original). 
 147. Id. at 962. The agreement was actually between Aftermath’s parent company and Apple. 
Aftermath’s parent company, UMG Recordings, Inc., was also a defendant in the lawsuit. For the 
sake of simplicity, I will refer to the defendants as Aftermath. 
 148. In 2003, F.B.T. and Aftermath entered into a new agreement that replaced the 1998 
agreement. The 2003 agreement retained the wording of the 1998 contract with respect to the 
royalty rates for records and masters. The parties amended the agreement in 2004 to include a 
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audit showed that Aftermath had been calculating permanent 
downloads under the Records Sold provision (with a royalty rate of 12 
to 20 percent of the adjusted retail price), F.B.T. sued, arguing that the 
applicable royalty rate should be that specified under the Masters 
Licensed provision (50 percent of net receipts).149 Aftermath argued 
that the permanent downloads should be calculated pursuant to the 
Records Sold provision.150 
In order to determine whether the Masters Licensed provision 
applied, the court had to decide whether Aftermath licensed the 
Eminem masters.151 The Ninth Circuit noted the distinction between 
license and sale under federal copyright law: 
When one looks to the Copyright Act, the terms “license” 
and “sale” have well differentiated meanings, and the 
differences between the two play an important role in the 
overall structures and policies that govern artistic rights. For 
example, under the language of the Act and the Supreme 
Court’s interpretations, a “sale” of a work may either be a 
transfer in title of an individual copy of a work, or a sale of 
all exclusive intellectual property rights in a work.152 
It concluded that Aftermath “did not ‘sell’ anything” to Apple and 
other download distributors because the distributors “did not obtain 
title to the digital files.”153 On the contrary, Aftermath retained the 
digital files, reserved the right to regain possession of them, and 
obtained recurring payments based on the volume of downloads.154 It 
added that under Ninth Circuit cases interpreting and applying federal 
copyright law, including the MAI trio, “where a copyright owner 
transfers a copy of copyrighted material, retains title, limits the uses to 
which the material may be put, and is compensated periodically based 
on the transferee’s exploitation of the material, the transaction is a 
license.”155 
 
provision that “Sales of Albums by way of permanent download shall be treated as [U.S. Normal 
Retail Channel] Net Sales for the purposes of escalations.” Id. (alteration in original). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 964. 
 152. Id. at 964–65. 
 153. Id. at 965. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
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The Ninth Circuit implicitly acknowledged a difference between 
the permanent downloads, which remained on the end user’s computer 
and were “sold,” and the masters, which were “licensed.”156 It stated 
that the agreement between Apple and Aftermath enabled the Eminem 
masters “to be sold” as permanent downloads.157 It wrote that the 
agreement was one of several that Aftermath entered into to “sell 
sound recordings in digital formats” and to “sell sound recordings as 
mastertones.”158 
These Ninth Circuit cases do not provide a bright-line test but set 
forth criteria to assess whether a transfer of physical possession or a 
grant of access to a copyrighted item is a license or a sale.159 
Contractual language identifying the transaction as a license instead 
of a sale is helpful but not determinative; what is crucial is when the 
contract was presented and the nature of the restrictive provisions. 
Part III delves further into the swirl of contractual issues involved in 
license-sale transactions. 
III.  CONTRACTUAL ISSUES AT THE HEART OF THE LICENSE V. SALE 
DILEMMA  
As this Part III explains, the license v. sale question requires (i) 
determining whether the agreement was properly formed and (ii) 
assessing whether the licensing restrictions are drafted as conditions 
or covenants. 
A.  Adhesive Forms to Protect Self-Replicating Innovations 
As previously discussed, an adhesive contract may be formed 
after the acts typically constituting the transaction have been 
performed. At least in some cases, a rolling contract (also known as a 
“pay-first-terms-later”) is used to prevent opportunistic160 buyers from 
knowingly exploiting a product in ways that diminish economic gains 
 
 156. Id. at 962. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. See also Universal Instruments Corp. v. Micro Sys. Eng’g, Inc., 924 F.3d 32, 45 (2d Cir. 
2019) (noting that MSEI was an owner of the station and server source code because it was not 
restricted from “discarding or disposing of the software as it wished”). 
 160. I use the term “opportunistic” to mean that the buyer is acting in a way that it knows the 
seller does not approve in order to obtain a benefit that was not part of the express bargain between 
the parties. 
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for the seller and deter future innovation.161 The problem of 
opportunism looms large for businesses that have invested substantial 
resources in creating a product. 
The Supreme Court addressed the problem of opportunism’s 
effect on innovation in Bowman v. Monsanto Co.,162 a case involving 
Roundup Ready soybean seeds that were genetically modified to resist 
glyphosate-based herbicides.163 Monsanto invented and patented 
Roundup Ready seeds and sold them to growers subject to a licensing 
agreement.164 The agreement allowed a grower to plant the seeds only 
for one season.165 The grower could consume or sell the crop, but it 
could not save any harvested soybeans for replanting.166 The 
restriction prevented growers from producing their own Roundup 
Ready seed, which would force them to repurchase the seeds each 
season.167 Bowman purchased Roundup Ready seeds every year for 
his first crop of the season.168 He complied with the terms of the 
agreement, using the seeds for planting once and then selling his crop 
to a grain elevator.169 For the second crop of the season, however, 
Bowman purchased soybean seeds from a grain elevator, which were 
cheaper than the premium price of the Roundup Ready seeds.170 The 
supply from the grain elevator contained a mix of seeds, and Bowman 
surmised they included Roundup Ready seeds from local farmers’ 
prior harvests.171 Bowman sprayed a glyphosate-based herbicide on 
his crops, and the surviving plants produced the genetically modified 
 
 161. See Jonathan M. Barnett, Why Is Everyone Afraid of IP Licensing?, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
123, 129–30 (2017) (noting four “facts of life” about innovation markets: “First, an innovation 
cannot earn a positive return unless it is embedded in a viable product delivered at a competitive 
cost to market. Second, successful commercialization requires that some entity place at risk 
significant capital and expertise. Third, the innovator is often not the individual or entity best suited 
to undertake the commercialization process. Fourth, in the vast majority of cases, any IP-protected 
asset faces competition from actual or potential substitutes, in which case it is the market, not the 
IP holder, that sets the terms of exchange . . . .”). The first two factors tend to be the most relevant 
considerations in assessing the effect of opportunism on innovation. 
 162. 569 U.S. 278 (2013). 
 163. Id. at 280–81. 
 164. Id. at 281. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 281–82. 
 170. Id. at 282. 
 171. Id. 
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Roundup Ready seeds.172 He replanted the seeds and grew more crops 
producing Roundup Ready seeds.173 When Monsanto learned what 
Bowman was doing, it sued on the grounds of patent infringement.174 
Bowman raised the defense of patent exhaustion, claiming that the 
seeds were the product of a prior authorized sale.175 The Federal 
Circuit rejected Bowman’s argument and the Supreme Court 
affirmed.176 
The Supreme Court decision in Monsanto did not resolve the 
license v. sale issue even though that issue is arguably the most 
significant one looming over the case. The Court addressed the license 
agreement only in passing, noting that it gave the purchaser the right 
to plant the seed and harvest and market one crop of beans.177 The 
Court employed the language of “sale” when referring to the 
transaction, but one that required compliance with the terms of a 
“license agreement.”178 In other words, the transaction involved the 
sale of a licensed product. Accordingly, the licensed product should 
be subject to the first sale doctrine, meaning that Monsanto’s patent 
rights terminated with respect to that item.179 Ordinarily, this poses no 
problem. A buyer who purchases a patented item may resell that 
specific item, but it may not make that item (or a duplicate) and sell it. 
The Monsanto case, however, involved a self-replicating product.180 
The Court stated that the patent exhaustion doctrine only applied to 
the item sold and did not affect the patentee’s right to prevent a 
purchaser from making new copies of the patented item.181 
Accordingly, the patent exhaustion doctrine did not permit the 
purchaser to recreate or construct a new product.182 The Court 
 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 282–83. 
 176. Id. at 283. 
 177. Id. at 285 n.3. 
 178. Id. 
 179. See Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008) (“The longstanding 
doctrine of patent exhaustion provides that the initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates 
all patent rights to that item.”). 
 180. PERZANOWSKI & SCHULTZ, supra note 1, at 163 (discussing the problem of self-
replicating technologies and the Bowman v. Monsanto case, observing that “patent exhaustion has 
also been complicated by technological advances, and in particular technologies where 
reproduction or replication is simple or even self-executing”). 
 181. Bowman, 569 U.S. at 284. 
 182. Id. 
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concluded that, by replanting the seeds and growing plants from which 
he could harvest additional patented soybeans, Bowman was 
“making” Monsanto’s patented invention.183 It reasoned that any other 
conclusion would provide Monsanto with “scant benefit,” in that, after 
receiving payment for the initial sales of its Roundup Ready seeds, 
growers could simply reproduce the seed themselves.184 Monsanto 
would not profit from its investment in the seeds, undermining the 
incentive for innovation, which is the objective of the Patent Act.185 
Bowman knew what the conditions of sale were, valued Monsanto’s 
invention, received the benefit from the invention, and yet, “devised a 
less orthodox approach” because he “did not want to pay the premium 
price that Monsanto charges for Roundup Ready seed.”186 In other 
words, in the Court’s view, Bowman was an opportunistic buyer, and 
his opportunism threatened the economic investment in innovation 
made by Monsanto.187 
An opportunistic buyer threatened a business’s investment in a 
reproducible innovation in an earlier, and possibly even more 
consequential, case. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg188 had nothing to do 
with patent exhaustion but caused a seismic change in the way courts 
viewed assent to standard form contracts. ProCD created a computer 
database containing information from thousands of telephone 
directories.189 It made two versions of the software, one for sale to the 
trade and the other, which was lower-priced, for sale to the general 
public for personal use.190 The software package that was sold to the 
general public contained a shrinkwrap license agreement, which 
restricted use of the software for “non-commercial purposes” only.191 
Matthew Zeidenberg purchased a package of ProCD software.192 
Despite knowing that the agreement prohibited it, he formed a 
company to copy and sell copies of the software on his own website 
at a lower price than ProCD itself charged.193 ProCD sued to enforce 
 
 183. Id. at 284–85. 
 184. Id. at 285. 
 185. See id. at 285–87. 
 186. Id. at 282. 
 187. Id. at 287. 
 188. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 189. Id. at 1449. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 1450. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
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the contract.194 Zeidenberg argued that because the terms were 
contained in the box, and inaccessible until after the purchase was 
completed, the agreement did not bind him.195 The Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that Zeidenberg had notice that 
terms governed the transaction prior to purchase and, after purchase, 
he had an opportunity to read the terms. Accordingly, he would be 
deemed to have accepted the terms if he failed to return the 
software.196 
Judge Easterbrook’s opinion focused on Zeidenberg’s 
opportunism and the way that it detrimentally affected ProCD’s ability 
to capitalize on its investment. Zeidenberg was fully aware of the 
restrictions on copying; he not only chose to ignore them, but he 
created a company to exploit and profit from ProCD’s investment.197 
Zeidenberg paid only $150 for each set of five discs.198 By contrast, 
ProCD had invested more than $10 million to compile and maintain 
the software.199 The court noted that ProCD engaged in a price 
differentiation strategy that ultimately benefited consumers.200 
Arguably, ProCD helped foster the development of mass consumer 
software products by creating a precedent that provided greater 
protection for a business’s investment in innovation from 
opportunistic purchasers. 
Unfortunately, ProCD also upended the existing law of contract 
formation and paved the way for opportunism, this time from 
businesses with the power to draft adhesive contracts with one-sided 
terms. Rolling contracts, such as the one in ProCD, are generally 
understood to be contractual terms that are attached to a transaction 
after the acts typically associated with the transaction have been 
completed.201 They are generally enforceable if there was notice of 
 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 1452 (“ProCD proposed a contract that a buyer would accept by using the software 
after having an opportunity to read the license at leisure.”). 
 197. Id. at 1450. 
 198. Id. at 1449. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. (“If ProCD had to recover all of its costs and make a profit by charging a single price—
that is, if it could not charge more to commercial users than to the general public—it would have 
to raise the price substantially over $150.”). 
 201. See Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 744 (2002) 
(describing a rolling contract as one where the “consumer orders and pays for goods before seeing 
most of the terms, which are contained on or in the packaging of the goods”). 
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terms prior to the transaction and an opportunity to reject them after 
the transaction. For example, Norcia v. Samsung Telecommunications 
America, LLC202 involved a brochure containing an arbitration 
agreement that was contained within a box and that could not be 
accessed without opening the package after purchase.203 The court in 
that case concluded that silence could not constitute acceptance where 
nothing on the outside of the packaging indicated that opening the box 
meant acceptance of terms contained in the box.204 By contrast, the 
court in Arizona Cartridge, found consumers accepted license terms 
printed on the outside of a printer cartridge box by opening it.205 
B.  The Importance of Specific Language in Contract Formation 
Because some wrap contracts,206 such as browsewraps and 
shrinkwraps, are unsigned, their formation depends on whether the 
recipient manifested assent after receiving reasonable notice. Precise 
wording may determine whether a contract was validly formed and 
thus, whether the license terms are binding. In Disney Enterprises, Inc. 
v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC,207 the court emphasized the 
language of reasonable notice.208 Disney offered films on “Combo 
Packs,” which contained a Blu-Ray disc, a digital versatile disc 
(DVD), and a piece of paper with an alphanumeric code.209 The code, 
which could be redeemed at RedeemDigitalMovies.com or  DisneyM 
oviesAnywhere.com, permitted the user to stream and download the 
movie.210 On the outside and bottom third of the Combo Pack box, the 
print stated, “Codes are not for sale or transfer.”211 In “[v]ery fine 
 
 202. 845 F.3d 1279 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 203. Id. at 1281–82. 
 204. Id. at 1287. 
 205. Ariz. Cartridge Remanufacturers Ass’n, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l Inc., 421 F.3d 981, 987–88 
(9th Cir. 2005). Furthermore, the court stated that customers were provided consideration in the 
form of a reduced price. Id. at 985. 
 206. Wrap contract is the general term I use to refer to shrinkwraps, clickwraps, browsewraps, 
and other contract forms that are unilaterally imposed upon the adherent and that do not require a 
signature in order to be binding. See KIM, supra note 23, at 2–3 (defining a “wrap contract” as a 
“blanket term to refer to a unilaterally imposed set of terms which the drafter purports to be legally 
binding and which is presented to the nondrafting party in a nontraditional format. . . . the adhering 
party does not have to use a pen in order to accept the terms”); see also MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, 
GLOBAL INTERNET LAW 186–95 (2d ed. 2016) (discussing different types of wrap contracts). 
 207. No. CV 17-08655 DDP (AGRx), 2018 WL 1942139 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2018). 
 208. Id. at *3. 
 209. Id. at *1. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
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print” at the bottom of the box, it stated that “Terms and Conditions 
apply” to the “Digital HD.”212 The download code insert stated that 
“Codes are not for sale or transfer.”213 
The Redeem Digital Movie website stated that the user 
“represents that [he] is the owner of the physical product that 
accompanied the digital code at the time of purchase. The redemption 
of a digital code sold or transferred separate from the original physical 
product is prohibited.”214 
The Movies Anywhere Terms of Use stated that the consumer 
“can enter authorized . . . Digital Copy codes from a Digital Copy 
enabled . . . physical product that is owned by [that consumer].”215 
They also stated that the “sale, distribution, purchase, or transfer of 
Digital Copy codes . . . is strictly prohibited.”216 Thus, the member 
was granted a “limited, personal use, non-transferable, non-
assignable, revocable non-exclusive and non-sublicensable right” to 
use the service and restricted the right to copy the copyright works in 
accordance with the terms of service.217 
Redbox, the defendant, purchased Combo Packs and removed the 
digital download codes, placed them into their own Redbox 
packaging, and offered them for sale at Redbox kiosks.218 Disney 
sued, seeking a preliminary injunction to stop Redbox from offering 
standalone digital codes.219 It argued that Redbox entered into the 
contract when it purchased the Combo Packs that contained terms on 
the outside, which stated that “Codes are not for sale or transfer.”220 
The court denied Disney’s motion based on the specific language 
printed on the outside of the Combo Pack boxes,221 stating: “The 
phrase ‘Codes are not for sale or transfer’ cannot constitute a shrink 
wrap contract because . . . Disney’s Combo Pack box makes no 
 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at *2 (alteration in original). 
 215. Id. (alteration in original). 
 216. Id. (alteration in original). 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at *3. 
 221. Id. at *1. 
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suggestion that opening the box constitutes acceptance of any further 
license restrictions.”222 
The court differentiated the box-top license language in Arizona 
Cartridge, because Lexmark 
not only provided consumers with specific notice of the 
existence of a license and explicitly stated that opening the 
package would constitute acceptance, but also set forth the 
full terms of the agreement, including the nature of the 
consideration provided, and described a post-purchase 
mechanism for rejecting the license. Here, in contrast, 
Disney relied solely upon the phrase “Codes are not for sale 
or transfer” to carry all of that weight.223 
The court criticized “similarly assertive but unquestionably non-
binding language” on the boxes.224 In particular, it noted that the 
language that “[t]his product . . . cannot be resold or rented 
individually” was “demonstrably false” because it violated the 
Copyright Act’s first sale doctrine.225 Accordingly, the “clearly 
unenforceable ‘cannot be resold individually’ language conveys 
nothing so much as Disney’s preference about consumers’ future 
behavior, rather than the existence of a binding agreement. At this 
stage, it appears that the accompanying ‘Not For Sale or Transfer’ 
language plays a similar role.”226 
Finally, the court indicated that Disney engaged in copyright 
misuse because it did not have the power to prevent consumers from 
selling or transferring the Blu-Ray discs or DVDs, yet the license 
agreements of both Redeem Digital Movies and Movies Anywhere 
assumed it did, and prohibited purchasers of Combo Packs from 
accessing the digital movie content even though they had already paid 
for it.227 
 
 222. Id. at *4 (citing Norcia v. Samsung Telecommc’ns. Am., LLC, 845 F.3d 1279, 1284 (9th 
Cir. 2017)). 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at *5. 
 225. Id. (alteration in original). 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at *6. 
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The court also addressed the first sale doctrine as it related to the 
transaction but found it was inapplicable.228 Redbox argued “Disney’s 
attempts to prohibit transfer of digital download codes [were] barred 
by the first sale doctrine.”229 Disney, on the other hand, argued that the 
first sale doctrine was inapplicable because the digital download codes 
were not “copies” until they were fixed on a downloader’s hard 
drive.230 According to Disney, the transaction involved the exclusive 
right to reproduce copyrighted work, not the right of distribution.231 
The court agreed, finding that “Disney appears to have sold something 
akin to an option to create a physical copy at some point in the 
future.”232 It concluded that, because there was no “particular, fixed 
copy of a copyrighted work” at the time Redbox purchased the 
download code, the first sale doctrine did not apply.233 
Subsequently, Disney changed the language on its Combo Pack 
boxes.234 The front of the box indicated that it contained a “Digital 
Code.”235 The back of the box stated in large print, “Digital Code 
Included*.”236 The asterisk corresponded to a textbox at the bottom of 
the package, which stated in all-capitalized but smaller text, “Digital 
code redemption requires prior acceptance of license terms and 
conditions. Codes only for personal use by recipient of this 
combination package or family member. Digital movie code . . . 
subject to expiration after May 15, 2023.”237 Elsewhere, in smaller 
type, the packaging stated, “The digital code contained in this package 
may not be sold separately and may be redeemed only by the recipient 
of this combination package or a family member. Visit MoviesAnyw
here.com, RedeemDigitalMovie.com, and disneytermsofuse.com for 
 
 228. Id. at *7 (stating that “the issues presently before the court can be resolved irrespective of 
the first sale doctrine question. Indeed, at this stage of proceedings, it appears to the court that the 
first sale doctrine is not applicable to this case”). 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. (“Thus, Disney contends, this case is solely about the exclusive right to reproduce a 
copyrighted work, and has nothing to do with the right of distribution or, by extension, the first sale 
doctrine's limitation on that exclusive right.”). 
 232. Id. at *9. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Disney Enters., Inc. v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1146, 1150 (C.D. 
Cal. 2018). 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id.  
 237. Id. (alteration in original). 
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code redemption and other applicable terms and conditions.”238 The 
paper with the code contained a similar notice and stated, “This digital 
code is part of a combination package and may not be sold separately” 
and “Digital code redemption is subject to prior acceptance of license 
terms and conditions.”239 
Disney also changed the terms of use on the digital download 
websites.240 On the RedeemDigitalMovie.com was a pop-up box that 
stated that the digital movie codes were owned by Disney and could 
not be sold separately from the original combination package.241 It 
also stated that the codes could be used “to obtain licensed access to 
digital movies only as specifically authorized” under the terms and 
conditions.242 The Movies Anywhere Terms of Use stated that a 
license to download or stream content did not create an ownership 
interest; that users would not redeem an unauthorized digital code; and 
that by redeeming a digital code, the user was representing that the 
user obtained the code in an original package and did not purchase the 
code separately and that the “representation is a condition of 
redemption.”243 In addition, the consumer was required to redeem the 
code by clicking in order to view the content.244 
Disney then renewed its motion for a preliminary injunction 
against Redbox.245 It alleged that Redbox customers who purchased a 
Disney code from Redbox violated Disney’s copyright because they 
were essentially making a false representation that they did not obtain 
the Code separate from the Combo Pack.246 Accordingly, any 
download using the code was unauthorized and infringed Disney’s 
copyright, and Redbox was contributorily liable for that 
infringement.247 The court stated that there was “no dispute” that the 
language on the download sites imposed significant use restrictions, 
and it granted Disney’s motion.248 In reaching that conclusion, the 
court focused on the enforceability of the relevant terms, both on the 
 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. at 1151. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at 1152. 
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packaging and on the download sites.249 But what the court found to 
be “critically important” was that consumers who did not accept the 
terms of the digital license could return the Combo Packs for a 
refund.250 The court also rejected Redbox’s copyright misuse 
defense.251 Because digital access was conditioned on the manner of 
obtaining the digital code, and not on continued possession of the 
physical discs, there was no copyright misuse.252 As the court noted, 
“the right to transfer a separate Code” is not protected by the first sale 
doctrine.253 
The court’s analysis is somewhat confounding; a simpler way to 
understand the difference in the two cases involves recognizing the 
Combo Packs as license-sale transactions (one involving both a sale 
and a license). The physical discs were sold, while the digital content 
was licensed, not sold. Combo Pack purchasers did not purchase the 
slips of paper containing the digital codes; they purchased a license to 
the digital content. The paper merely directed the purchaser to a 
website where the purchaser could license the content. Disney retained 
control over the purchasers’ use of the digital content; by contrast, it 
did not control the purchasers’ access to the physical discs after 
purchase. Disney (through the download websites) retained the power 
to control the purchasers’ access to the digital content. It did not retain 
the power to control the purchasers’ access to the content stored on the 
physical discs. 
Yet, a conclusion that digital content is licensed and not sold 
should not necessarily lead to a finding that a violation of any contract 
provision constitutes copyright infringement. In granting Disney’s 
refiled motion for preliminary injunction, the court focused on the 
specificity of the redrafted language.254 While the new language did 
 
 249. Id. at 1153. 
 250. Id. at 1155. 
 251. Id. at 1157. 
 252. Id. (“Under the old terms, a Combo Pack owner who disposed of the discs was indeed left 
with a worthless code because continued possession of the discs was a condition of digital access. 
Now, however, digital access is conditioned not on possession of the discs, but on the manner of 
Code acquisition. A Combo Pack owner who disposes of the discs is left with the same digital 
access rights he or she always possessed.”). 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. at 1154. The court stated:  
It is undisputed that Redbox has actual knowledge of the redemption sites’ 
clickwrap terms, which do appear to create a restrictive license. Both sites specify 
that the user is only granted a license rather than ownership. The 
RedeemDigitalMovie.com terms state, “You may use digital movie codes to obtain 
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provide better notice than the original language, the court did not 
consider whether that new language imposed a condition to the license 
grant or whether it was merely a covenant on the part of the 
purchaser.255 The difference is integral to the license v. sale dilemma. 
C.  Conditions v. Covenants in Patent and Copyright Licenses 
Even with valid contract formation, a restrictive licensing clause 
may not be enforceable, or it may not be enforced the way the licensor 
expects or desires. For example, in U.S. Naval Institute v. Charter 
Communications, Inc.,256 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
addressed whether a licensee’s premature publication of the paperback 
edition of a book constituted copyright infringement.257 The plaintiff, 
United States Naval Institute (“Naval”), and the defendant, Berkley 
Publishing Group (“Berkley”), entered into an agreement “made this 
14th day of September 1984” that granted Berkley “the exclusive right 
to publish and reproduce, distribute and sell English-language 
paperback editions” of the novel The Hunt for Red October.258 
Paragraph 2 of the agreement stated that the term of the license “will 
begin on the date written above” and would continue for at least five 
years after Berkley’s first publication of the book.259 Paragraph 4 of 
the agreement stated that “Berkley was to publish the paperback 
 
licensed access to digital movies only as specifically authorized . . . [,]” and the 
Movies Anywhere terms refer to a “Copyright License Grant” and state that “[t]he 
purchase of a license to stream or download any Movies Anywhere Content does 
not create an ownership interest in the licensed Content.” These and other terms 
restrict downloaders’ use or transfer of the digital content.  
Id. (alteration in the original). 
 255. It also skated around but did not directly tackle the issue of digital first sale. In another 
case, however, the Second Circuit found that the first sale doctrine did not apply to digital media. 
In Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 910 F.3d 649 (2d Cir. 2018), ReDigi sought to host an 
online marketplace for reselling lawfully purchased digital music files. Id. at 652. The plaintiff 
record companies sued, alleging that ReDigi’s system infringed their copyrights. Id. at 654. On 
appeal, the court framed the “primary issue” to be “whether ReDigi’s system version 1.0 lawfully 
enables resales of its users’ digital files” and found that resales of ReDigi infringed because they 
violated the plaintiffs’ exclusive right of reproduction under 17 U.S.C. § 106(1). Id. at 655–64. In 
so ruling, the Second Circuit agreed with the lower court. Id. at 652. The lower court also found 
that the digital files were not subject to the first sale doctrine because they were not “lawfully 
made,” but the Second Circuit, finding sufficient grounds for affirmance, declined to rule on this 
issue. Id. at 656. 
 256. 936 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 257. Id. at 694. 
 258. Id. at 693, 695. 
 259. Id. at 695. 
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edition ‘not sooner than October 1985.’”260 Berkley shipped the 
paperback edition early so that retail sales began on September 15, 
1985.261 Naval sought recovery for copyright infringement.262 Berkley 
argued that it “could not be held liable for copyright infringement 
since [it was] the exclusive licensee of the paperback edition copyright 
as of September 14, 1984.”263 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
agreed, finding that because Berkley was the owner of the right to 
publish the paperback edition of the book, its early publication could 
not constitute copyright infringement.264 It did, however, constitute a 
breach of contract.265 
Under the Copyright Act, “[a]n exclusive license granted by the 
copyright owner constitutes a transfer of ownership of the copyright 
rights conveyed in the license.”266 But the condition v. covenant 
distinction is not limited to exclusive licenses. In Blizzard, after 
deciding that WoW players were licensees and not owners of copies 
of the software, the court addressed the issue of contractual covenants 
and license conditions.267 It characterized contractual terms that 
limited the scope of the license as “conditions,” and distinguished 
them from other terms which were “covenants.”268 Thus, in order for 
Blizzard to demonstrate that a user committed copyright infringement, 
it had to demonstrate that the term that the user violated was a 
condition rather than a covenant.269 
In order to determine whether a provision is a covenant or a 
condition, courts look to contract law. In a license v. sale transaction, 
contract law determines which legal regime—copyright or contract—
applies to the underlying claim and thus, whether the claim is for 
copyright infringement or breach of contract. As the Blizzard court 
explained, “[a] covenant is a contractual promise . . . to act or refrain 
 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. at 693. 
 262. Id. at 694. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 695. 
 265. Id. at 696; see also U.S. Naval Inst. v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 875 F.2d 1044, 1051 (2d 
Cir. 1989) (finding that Berkley violated the contractual ban on pre-October 1985 publication). 
 266. U.S. Naval Inst., 936 F.2d at 695; see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (“A ‘transfer of 
copyright ownership’ is an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance . . . 
of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited 
in time or place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license.”). 
 267. MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Ent., Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 939 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
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from acting in a particular way” while “[a] condition precedent is an 
act or event that must occur before a duty to perform a promise 
arises.”270 The Blizzard court stated that “[t]o recover for copyright 
infringement based on breach of a license agreement, (1) the copying 
must exceed the scope of the defendant’s license and (2) the copyright 
owner’s complaint must be grounded in an exclusive right of copyright 
(e.g., unlawful reproduction or distribution).”271 
Significantly, it stated that “for a licensee’s violation of a contract 
to constitute copyright infringement, there must be a nexus between 
the condition and the licensor’s exclusive rights of copyright.”272 
Courts generally apply an interpretive preference in favor of 
finding a covenant rather than a condition where the language is 
uncertain; this is particularly true where the failure to meet a condition 
would result in a forfeiture.273 Consequently, in Blizzard, the court 
found that despite the relevant section being titled “Limitations on 
Your Use of the Service,” the contractual prohibitions against bots and 
unauthorized third-party software were covenants and not conditions 
because they did not condition Blizzard’s grant of license on the 
players’ compliance to the prohibitions.274 
D.  Ownership Rights and the Limits of Contractual Authority 
Although the Supreme Court noted the “historical kinship” 
between copyright and patent law, as Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
noted, they are not “identical twins.”275 Their dissimilarities are 
especially relevant where the license agreement does not give the 
licensee the right to “sell.” A patent gives the patentee the right to 
 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. at 940. 
 272. Id. at 941; see also Accusoft Corp. v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., No. 12-cv-40007-TSH, 2015 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156693, at *72 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2015) (“It is settled law in this circuit that 
uses of a copyrighted work that stay within the scope of a nontransferable license are immunized 
from copyright claims.”). 
 273. See Blizzard, 629 F.3d at 939 (noting that “[c]onditions precedent are disfavored because 
they tend to work forfeitures” and “[w]herever possible, equity construes ambiguous contract 
provisions as covenants rather than conditions”); see also Richard F. Kline, Inc. v. Shook 
Excavating & Hauling, Inc., 885 A.2d 381, 388 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) (“Whether a provision 
in a contract constitutes a condition precedent is a question of ‘construction, dependent on the intent 
of the parties to be gathered from the words they have employed and, in case of ambiguity, after 
resort to the other permissible aids to interpretation.’”). 
 274. Blizzard, 629 F.3d at 939–40. 
 275. Impression, 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1539 (2017) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
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exclude others from making, using, selling, and importing the 
invention.276 A copyright owner, on the other hand, has the exclusive 
right to reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute, publicly 
perform, and publicly display the copyrighted work.277 The ownership 
rights determine the types of restrictions that may be placed on 
subsequent transactions. 
Patent licenses where the licensee is a distributor of product 
usually include the right to make, use, sell, and offer to sell. Copyright 
licenses, on the other hand, do not. The reason for this difference stems 
from the different rights of copyright and patent holders. For example, 
if Patentee licenses to Licensee the right to make and use, but not to 
sell, the patented invention, Licensee may not enter into a subsequent 
transaction with a third party unless Patentee has given Licensee a 
right to sublicense the invention. Even then, Licensee may only 
sublicense the rights that he or she has. Because the agreement 
between Patentee and Licensee did not permit Licensee to sell the 
invention—and Patentee did not sell the invention to Licensee—there 
has been no “authorized sale,” and neither the Licensee nor the 
Sublicensee is authorized to sell the invention. 
By contrast, if Copyright Owner licenses to Licensee the right to 
make copies and distribute an item, the Licensee may make a copy and 
sell it to Customer since the Copyright Owner does not have the right 
to exclude the Licensee from selling. If Copyright Owner and 
Licensee’s contract prohibited the Licensee from selling the copy, the 
Licensee would have breached their contract although he or she would 
not have infringed the license. In this important respect, transactions 
involving patented items and copyrighted items typically differ. 
There is also the question of contractual authority and 
enforceability. The cases tend not to distinguish between contract 
terms that are negotiated, those that are non-negotiated due to lack of 
bargaining power, and those that are unilaterally imposed by one party 
after the transaction has occurred. Yet, these scenarios are quite 
different. Where the parties have negotiated the contract, any 
conditions on the transaction shape the nature of the transaction. 
Where one party has unilaterally imposed terms with a standard form, 
it is not clear that the terms should be enforced. As I have noted 
 
 276. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2018). 
 277. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018). 
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elsewhere, a notice is not always a contract.278 A notice does not 
constitute a contract unless the other party intended to agree to it.279 
There can be no bargain, no mutual assent, and no contract unless the 
non-drafting party intends to engage in conduct that manifests 
assent.280 The silence of the offeree generally does not manifest 
acceptance.281 As the Ninth Circuit noted in a recent case, “[a]n offeree 
may demonstrate acceptance through conduct, but not where . . . the 
contractual provisions are ‘inconspicuous’ and ‘contained in a 
document whose contractual nature is not obvious.’”282 
If the offeree does not manifest assent, then the terms are merely 
a notice and their effectiveness depends upon whether the entity 
drafting the notice had the authority to unilaterally impose terms. The 
authority of the drafter to unilaterally impose terms is tied to property 
ownership. For example, X’s authority to enforce a “No Smoking” 
sign depends on whether X owns the property where the sign is posted. 
X’s authority to unilaterally impose terms does not extend to property 
that X does not own. Furthermore, X’s authority to enforce a “No 
Smoking” sign does not mean that X can unilaterally impose upon Y a 
one-hundred-dollar fee for smoking, even if Y smokes on X’s property. 
If X wishes to impose a one-hundred-dollar fee on those who smoke 
on X’s property, the “$100 Fee for Smoking on Property” notice must 
be conspicuous enough so that Y understands that by entering X’s 
property, Y must adhere to those terms. In that situation, the notice 
“$100 Fee for Smoking on Property” is contractual and Y manifests 
assent by entering the property. However, after the transaction has 
occurred, X has no power to unilaterally impose terms. For example, 
X cannot charge Y an entrance fee after the visit unless Y had notice 
of the fee prior to the visit. X’s power is tied to X’s property. 
 
 278. KIM, supra note 23, at 135 (noting that the “essential problem with wrap contract doctrine 
is that courts mistake the role of notice with that of contract” but that notice is “very different from 
contract”). 
 279. KIM, supra note 23, at 134. 
 280. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19(2) (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“The conduct of a 
party is not effective as a manifestation of his assent unless he intends to engage in the conduct and 
knows or has reason to know that the other party may infer from his conduct that he assents.”). 
 281. Id. (noting that the silence of the offeree without intent to engage in conduct does not 
manifest acceptance); see also Norcia v. Samsung Telecommc’ns. Am., LLC, 845 F.3d 1279, 1284 
(9th Cir. 2017) (citing California’s general rule that “silence or inaction does not constitute 
acceptance of an offer”). 
 282. Velasquez-Reyes v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 777 F. App’x 241, 241 (9th Cir. 2019) 
(quoting Windsor Mills Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 101 Cal. Rptr. 347, 351 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1972)). 
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Moreover, the power of the parties to reorder their rights and 
obligations is limited to those rights and obligations; they do not have 
the power to recharacterize relationships that are defined by law, 
although they may define their rights and obligations so that they fall 
into a particular legal definition. Contracting parties, for example, 
cannot define whether their relationship is a partnership; that 
relationship is defined by the law and determined by whether they are 
engaged in a business for profit. If they are, they may alter the 
particulars of that relationship, but they cannot deny that they are in a 
partnership by writing it on a piece of paper that they both sign. 
Similarly, contracting parties cannot recharacterize an employment 
relationship as an independent contractor relationship.283 These terms 
are beyond the contract-making purview of the parties. For the same 
reason, the parties cannot change a sale into a license simply by so 
stating in their contract. 
The court in Blizzard made a fundamental error because it did not 
distinguish the sale of the software from the sale of the license. The 
WoW software was not sold, but the license to use that software 
was.284 The transfer of the license is subject to the first sale doctrine. 
The licensor does not have the power to recharacterize the transaction 
or to restrict its sale because that is not one of the exclusive rights of a 
copyright owner.285 It may, however, limit the scope of the license or 
subject the license to a condition precedent with properly drafted 
language.286 
Similarly, a patentee may not recharacterize a transaction that is 
a sale as a license; it may, however, restrict the license so that certain 
conditions must be met before a sale is authorized. The doctrine of 
patent exhaustion means that the patentee may not impose post-sale 
restrictions.287 The result is different under copyright’s first sale 
 
 283. See Type of Relationship, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-
employed/type-of-relationship (last reviewed or updated July 31, 2020) (stating that “[a]lthough a 
contract may state that the worker is an employee or an independent contractor, this is not sufficient 
to determine the worker’s status. The IRS is not required to follow a contract stating that the worker 
is an independent contractor, responsible for paying his or her own self employment tax. How the 
parties work together determines whether the worker is an employee or an independent 
contractor”). 
 284. MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Ent., Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 938 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 285. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018). 
 286. See Blizzard, 629 F.3d at 939. 
 287. Impression, 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1531 (2017). 
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doctrine. A copyright holder may impose post-sale restrictions as long 
as they derive from her exclusive copyright rights.288 
For example, Patentee enters into an agreement with Retailer 
where Retailer may sell, but only at its stores in North America, 
patented items to Customers. If Retailer sells patented items to 
Customers at its stores in North America, those Customers are not 
limited by the terms of the agreement between Patentee and Retailer. 
Accordingly, Customer may sell the patented item in Europe provided 
that Customer made her original purchase at Retailer’s store in North 
America (i.e., it was an “authorized sale”). 
The result is different for copyright restrictions. Assume 
Copyright Owner enters into an agreement with Retailer where 
Retailer may sell, but only at its stores in North America, items to 
Customers with certain copyright restrictions. If Retailer sells those 
copyright items to Customer, those items continue to be subject to the 
copyright restrictions. Customer may not, for example, make copies 
of the item if the license prohibits copying. Customer may, however, 
sell the licensed item because a copyright owner does not have the 
power to limit sales of copyrighted works because the right to exclude 
others from selling is not one of the copyright holder’s exclusive 
rights.289 
IV.  A METHODOLOGY FOR EVALUATING LICENSE V. SALE 
TRANSACTIONS  
The case law at first glance may seem impenetrable but on closer 
examination yields several important principles that can be used to 
assess the license v. sale issue. First, an authorized sale—and only an 
authorized sale—triggers the copyright first sale doctrine and patent 
exhaustion. Second, a contractual breach differs from infringement. 
Infringement occurs when the licensee exceeds the scope of the license 
but not where the licensee breaches another provision. Finally, a 
contract may give rise to both a claim for breach and a claim for 
infringement; however, the claims cannot be for violating the same 
provision. In short, it is important to distinguish the provisions of a 
contract and to understand their legal effect. Some provisions may 
express an undertaking (i.e., a covenant) and thus create an obligation; 
 
 288. See 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
 289. Id. 
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other provisions may express permission (i.e., a grant) and thus 
authorize actions that would otherwise be impermissible. 
In this Part IV, I propose a methodology for analyzing whether a 
transaction is a license or a sale. This methodology requires first 
analyzing the structure of the transaction in order to characterize it as 
a license, a sale, or a sale of a license. Then it analyzes the nature of 
the terms to assess the nature and enforceability of the restrictions. As 
previously mentioned, the characteristics of the transaction, and not 
what the parties call it in their contract, determine whether it is a 
license or sale and whether the UCC applies. However, the parties may 
shape the characteristics of the transaction contractually. The power 
to do that differs depending on whether the transaction involves a 
patent or a copyright. 
Software poses unique challenges because it may involve both a 
patent and a copyright. In negotiated transactions where the license 
agreement was entered into prior to the acts that constitute the 
transaction (i.e., the transaction did not involve a rolling contract), the 
transaction is a license, not a sale, which may involve both patent 
rights and copyrights. Consequently, a restriction on subsequent 
transfers is enforceable because there was no patent exhaustion. 
However, in mass consumer transactions where the license agreement 
is a rolling contract, the transaction is a sale. The sale results in patent 
exhaustion and the copyright first sale doctrine also applies. The 
license terms that purport to restrict the purchaser’s right to transfer 
the software should not be enforceable as the patentee’s exclusive 
rights are exhausted with respect to that product. However, the license 
terms that restrict the purchaser’s use of the product are enforceable 
because the copyright holder’s rights are not exhausted under the first 
sale doctrine, which only permits subsequent transfers. Yet, not every 
violation of the license agreement constitutes infringement. The effect 
of any given provision depends on whether the provision is drafted as 
a covenant or a condition. 
My proposed methodology recognizes the difference between a 
license restriction in a negotiated agreement and one in a mass 
adhesive form agreement. The enforcement of the reasonable 
expectations of the parties is a bedrock principle of contract law that 
has been discarded by law-and-economics-minded courts in their 
quest for a type of efficiency that considers only the elimination of 
transactional hurdles. My proposed methodology reflects the realities 
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of mass adhesive form contracting to better reflect the reasonable 
expectations of the parties. 
A.  Reasonable Expectations and the Form of Wrap Contracts 
 Studies have demonstrated that most consumers do not read 
standard form software license contracts.290 Although an actual intent 
to be legally bound to terms may not be required for contract 
formation, contract terms should reflect what the parties intended.291 
The role of courts in construing a contract is to determine the intent of 
the parties and to ascertain what they “reasonably understood to be the 
terms of the agreement.”292 As one court noted, “[s]tandardized 
contracts of adhesion do not squarely fit within a traditional analysis 
of contractual intent.”293 As a result, in the context of standardized 
contracts, a factfinder may consider “‘the totality of the circumstances 
in determining the intent of the parties, rather than being strictly 
confined to the four corners of a standardized agreement’ when the 
parties’ ‘true intent was not accurately reflected in the written 
contract.’”294 
Section 211(3) of the Restatement (Second) Contracts states that 
“[w]here the other party has reason to believe that the party 
manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that the writing 
contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement.”295 
This principle of “reasonable expectations” with standardized 
 
 290. Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-
Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (2014) (finding that “only one or two of every 1,000 retail 
software shoppers” accesses license agreements); Nathaniel S. Good et al., Noticing Notice: A 
Large-Scale Experiment on the Timing of Software License Agreements 5 (2007) (conference 
paper) (reporting that only 1.4% of 222 subjects read end-user license agreements often and 66.2% 
reported rarely reading or browsing them). 
 291. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“Neither real nor 
apparent intention that a promise be legally binding is essential to the formation of a contract, but 
a manifestation of intention that a promise shall not affect legal relations may prevent the formation 
of a contract.”). 
 292. See Mitchell v. Wells Fargo Bank, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1261, 1288 (D. Utah 2017) (quoting 
State v. Terrazas, 336 P.3d 594, 605 (Utah Ct. App. 2014)) (stating that the “underlying purpose in 
construing a contract is to ascertain the intentions of the parties, and to identify what the parties 
reasonably understood to be the terms of the agreement” (quoting Terrazas, 336 P.3d at 605)). 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. at 1289 (quoting Allen v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 810 (Utah 
1992) (Stewart, J., concurring)). 
 295. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (AM. L. INST. 1981); see also Lauvetz 
v. Alaska Sales and Serv., 828 P.2d 162, 165 (Alaska 1991) (applying the analysis of section 211 
outside the insurance context). 
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agreements recognizes that “[a]lthough customers typically adhere to 
standardized agreements and are bound by them without even 
appearing to know the standard terms in detail, they are not bound to 
unknown terms which are beyond the range of reasonable 
expectation.”296 Professor Eric Zacks notes, “[s]ection 211 was an 
elegantly designed, thoughtful solution by impressive contract 
theorists to address the problem of assent to standardized contracts,” 
but it is “rarely cited with respect to any standardized contract dispute, 
and even where cited, it rarely provides relief to the non-drafting 
party.”297 Notwithstanding its underappreciated status, section 211(3) 
is, as Professor Wayne Barnes writes, “a rule that is consistent with 
the objective theory of contracts and with general principles of the 
assent-based nature of contracts.”298 
The reasonable expectations doctrine captured in section 211(3) 
may be particularly helpful in mitigating the problems associated with 
wrap contracts. The expectations of the non-drafting party are often 
established by the form of the contract.299 A consumer signing a 
contract with a pen has awareness that the transaction is a legal one, 
even if he or she has not read the terms. A consumer clicking an 
“Agree” icon may be less aware of the legally binding nature of that 
click, and a consumer simply browsing a website with a conspicuous 
hyperlink may be completely unaware of the legal nature of that 
 
 296. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 1981); see also Gove 
v. Career Sys. Dev. Corp., 689 F.3d 1, 4–5 (1st Cir. 2012) (stating that “where the parties are in 
unequal bargaining positions, such as ‘[w]here a standard-form, printed contract is submitted to the 
other on a “take it or leave it”  basis, upon equitable principles the provisions of the contract are 
generally construed to meet the reasonable expectations of the party in the inferior bargaining 
position” (alteration in original) (quoting Barrett v. McDonald Invs., Inc., 870 A2d. 146, 150 (Me. 
2005))). 
 297. Eric A. Zacks, The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211: Unfulfilled Expectations and 
the Future of Modern Standardized Consumer Contracts, 7 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 733, 736 
(2016). But cf. Max True Plastering Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 912 P.2d 861, 864 (Okla. 1996) 
(noting that “[t]he doctrine of reasonable expectations has evolved as an interpretative tool to aid 
courts in discerning the intention of the parties bound by adhesion contracts. It . . . takes into 
account the realities of present day commercial practice”). 
 298. Wayne R. Barnes, Toward a Fairer Model of Consumer Assent to Standard Form 
Contracts: In Defense of Restatement Subsection 211(3), 82 WASH. L. REV. 227, 231 (2007). 
Barnes also noted that it is “[o]verlooked and underappreciated in the debate over the proper 
treatment of standard form contracts.”  Id.; cf. Zacks, supra note 297, at 758 (finding “only 196 
cases cited section 211 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts” with only 34 where the non-
drafting party received “some form of relief”). 
 299. See KIM, supra note 23, at 200–01 (“The form of a contract, like its function, sets 
expectations. . . . The reasonable expectations of parties depend upon what type of contract is at 
issue.”). 
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transaction. Courts should consider the form of a contract in assessing 
the reasonable expectations of the parties.300 
License-sales transactions accomplished with adhesive wrap 
contracts raise unique policy concerns. Bargaining imbalance and the 
failure to read and understand the fine print are problems associated 
with adhesive contracts generally; however, they are particularly 
striking in the context of license-sale transactions that may affect 
important rights to use or transfer a product. 
Consumer reasonable expectations of the substance of terms 
should be distinguished from consumer complacency or inaction, 
which is related to the likelihood that a given term will be enforced. 
Some provisions in standard commercial transactions may be 
overlooked because they relate to events that consumers believe are 
not likely to occur. For example, terms such as those imposing 
mandatory arbitration, warranty disclaimers, and limitations of 
liability become relevant only if a dispute arises between the parties. 
These terms301 may never be raised or enforced in a transaction if there 
is no dispute between the parties. By contrast, license terms alter the 
very essence of a transaction that otherwise resembles an ordinary 
sale. A typical license-sale transaction seems like a sales transaction 
to the average consumer at the time the transaction is completed, and 
the consumer may expect to have the benefits of ownership post-
purchase. 
To recognize consumer reasonable expectations does not mean 
that the company cannot impose other rules or conditions by 
agreement; however, if it wishes to do so, it cannot unilaterally impose 
terms in a standard form subject only to a standard of “reasonable 
notice.” Instead, the business should be required to have the consumer 
specifically assent to those terms by separately signing the relevant 
provision. Bringing the specific term to the consumer’s attention 
makes it more salient, and thus more likely to be within that 
consumer’s reasonable expectations.302 This type of specific assent is 
 
 300. Id. at 201 (“An interpretive framework that expressly considers the form and function of 
a contract reflects reality and better protects the reasonable expectations of the parties.”). 
 301. See generally id. at 44–48 (describing how various contract terms may be used to limit 
liability in certain circumstances). 
 302. Even in this scenario, the term may be unenforceable if it is against public policy or subject 
to a contract defense, such as unconscionability. 
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also consistent with the common law,303 the UCC,304 and with current 
trends in electronic contracting law.305 In an influential case, the court 
in Berkson v. Gogo LLC306 proposed a four-part test to analyze 
electronic adhesive contracts that asks, in part: “Did the merchant 
clearly draw the consumer’s attention to material terms that would 
alter what a reasonable consumer would understand to be her default 
rights when initiating an online consumer transaction from the 
consumer’s state of residence . . . ?”307 
Imposing a specific assent requirement accords with canons of 
construction. Courts generally construe ambiguous terms in a contract 
against the drafter, especially if the contract is one of adhesion.308 As 
previously mentioned, there is also an interpretive preference against 
conditions that would result in a forfeiture. Given these canons of 
construction and the realities of standard form contracting, in order for 
a restriction in a standard form license agreement to be interpreted as 
a condition, the non-drafting party should have specifically assented 
to it. 
 
 303. Certain provisions, such as limitations of liability, must be drawn to the attention of the 
adhering party. See Berrios v. United Parcel Serv., 627 A.2d 701, 705 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1992) (noting that limitations of liability are ineffective where motorists were not made aware of 
it), aff’d per curiam, 672 A2d. 665 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993); Allright, Inc. v. Schroeder, 
551 S.W.2d 745, 747 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (noting that posted notice limiting liability must be 
called to attention of bailor before it can be deemed part of bailment contract). 
 304. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(a) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1951) (stating that 
additional terms are proposals and not part of the contract if the other party is not a merchant); id. 
§ 2-209(2) (requiring no-oral modification clause to be separately signed by non-merchant). 
 305. Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 402 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (four-part test that 
includes inquiry regarding notice of specific terms); Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp., 817 F.3d 1029, 
1035 (7th Cir. 2016) (clicking on a box does not mean that consumer has notice of all contract 
terms); Scotti v. Tough Mudder Inc., 97 N.Y.S.3d 825, 835 (Sup. Ct. 2019) (despite 
conspicuousness of agreement, the arbitration provision was not sufficiently conspicuous). 
 306. 97 F. Supp. 3d 359 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 307. Id. at 402. The Berkson court mentioned specifically “[t]he right to (a) not have a payment 
source charged without notice (i.e., automatic payment renewal); (b) bring a civil consumer 
protection action under the law of her state of residence and in the courts in her state of residence; 
and (c) participate in a class or collective action? If not, then (a), (b), or (c) should not be enforced 
against the consumer.” Id. 
 308. See Mitchell v. Wells Fargo Bank, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1261, 1286 (D. Utah 2017) 
(“Ambiguous language is construed against the drafter, particularly in the context of adhesion 
contracts.”); Gove. v. Career Sys. Dev. Corp., 689 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting that a contract 
“is to be interpreted to effect the parties’ intentions as reflected in the written instrument, construed 
with regard for the subject matter, motive, and purpose of the agreement, as well as the object to 
be accomplished. . . . [A]mbiguities in a document are construed against its drafter. . . . This rule is 
intended to effectuate the intent of the parties” (citations omitted)). 
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Furthermore, the requirement of specific assent to material terms 
is consistent with commercial law and its efforts to balance the needs 
of the marketplace with contract law objectives. In particular, section 
2-207 of the UCC balances the realities of form contracts with the 
expectations of the parties by requiring specific assent to material 
terms to avoid unfair surprise.309 Notably, additional or different terms 
contained in a form agreement between a merchant and a consumer 
are not part of a contract unless agreed to by the consumer.310 
Similarly, a provision in a standard form that seeks to condition use of 
the license in a way that defeats the reasonable expectations of the 
consumer should not be considered part of the contract. 
B.  Transaction Sequence and Contractual Consequence 
A business may use restrictive contractual terms to try to 
characterize a transaction as a license or sale. If the transaction 
involves a patented item, the contractual terms determine whether the 
transaction is a sale or a license because the patentee has the right to 
characterize the transaction. If, however, the transaction involves a 
copyrighted item, the contractual language is useful in assessing the 
characteristics of the transaction, but it is not determinative. The 
copyright holder does not have the right to characterize the transaction 
as a sale or a license; it may, however, structure the transaction in such 
a way that it fits the legal definition of a license or a sale.  
A business also may use contracts in an effort to impose post-sale 
restrictions. If the transaction is a sale, then the patentee’s patent rights 
are exhausted, and the purchaser may sell that item to another party 
regardless of a contractual prohibition on subsequent sale. Similarly, 
the sale of a copyrighted item means that the purchaser may 
subsequently sell that item to another party. However, unlike with a 
patent transaction, a sale does not terminate the copyright holder’s 
rights. Finally, contractual language determines the scope of the 
license. Restrictive contractual terms may be either conditions or 
covenants. Failure to comply with a condition that limits a license’s 
 
 309. U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1951) (permitting additional 
terms in a standard form acceptance between merchants unless the terms “materially alter” the 
terms of the offer); see also id. cmt. 3 (stating that terms that materially alter the original bargain 
are not included “unless expressly agreed to by the other party”). 
 310. U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1951) (stating that additional terms 
in a standard form acceptance are “proposals for addition to the contract” unless the terms are 
between merchants). 
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scope means that the licensee has infringed.311 A failure to comply 
with any other provision may constitute a breach of contract but will 
not constitute infringement. 
1.  Contractual Restrictions and Transactions Involving Patents 
Although a patentee may prevent a licensee from selling the 
patented item, it may not prevent a purchaser of that item from doing 
so.312 Consequently, the nature of subsequent transactions depends 
upon the original transaction between the patentee and the licensee or 
purchaser. The following illustrates how the license v. sale question 
should be analyzed for transactions involving patented items:  
(1)  If the first transaction by the patentee is a sale, then 
subsequent transactions involving that same item can also be sales. For 
example, if Patentee enters into a contract where it sells patented items 
to Retailer, Retailer may sell that item to Customer Z. 
(2)  If the first transaction by the Patentee is a license, then 
subsequent transactions may be either licenses or sales depending on 
the scope of the license between Patentee and Licensee. 
The license agreement may have the following types of 
provisions: (a) it might permit the Licensee to sell patented items 
without any restrictions on the Licensee’s ability to do so; (b) it might 
permit the Licensee to sell items with restrictions on the Licensee’s 
ability to do so; (c) it might permit the Licensee to sell items without 
restrictions on the Licensee’s ability to do so but require the Licensee 
to impose conditions on his or her customers; and (d) it might allow 
Licensee to sublicense patented items. The validity of each of these 
terms is discussed below: 
a. If the license agreement provides that Licensee may sell 
patented items without restrictions on the Licensee’s ability to 
 
 311. See Universal Instruments Corp. v. Micro Sys. Eng’g, Inc., 924 F.3d 32, 49 (2d Cir. 2019) 
(stating that despite parties being in contractual privity, “vindication of an exclusive right under the 
Copyright Act, read into a license by negative implication, is preempted by the Copyright Act”); 
see also Kamakazi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp., 684 F.2d 228, 230 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating 
that because licensor sued licensee for publishing works after the contract had expired, the claim 
was for copyright infringement and not breach of contract); Marshall v. New Kids on the Block 
P’ship, 780 F. Supp. 1005, 1008–09 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting that “if the plaintiff-licensor seeks 
relief directly under the licensing agreement . . . then the claim is merely a state law contract claim,” 
but that if the licensee uses the copyright material in a manner that “exceeds either the duration or 
the scope of the license,” then the action “arises under the copyright laws just as if the claim were 
against any other infringer who is a stranger to the plaintiff”). 
 312. See Impression, 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1535 (2017). 
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do so, then subsequent transactions can be sales. For example, if 
Patentee licenses to Manufacturer the right to make, use, sell, 
and offer to sell patented items, then Manufacturer can sell the 
item to Customer. 
b. If the license agreement provides that Licensee may sell 
patented items but imposes restrictive conditions on the 
Licensee’s ability to do so, then subsequent transactions are 
authorized sales only if the Licensee complied with the 
conditions. 
If Patentee licenses to Manufacturer the right to make, use, sell, 
and offer to sell patented items only in North America, then 
Manufacturer’s sale of the item in France is unauthorized, and patent 
exhaustion does not apply. 
If Patentee licenses to Manufacturer the right to make, use, sell, 
and offer to sell patented items only in North America, then 
Manufacturer’s subsequent sale of the item to Customer in Canada is 
authorized. That item may be subsequently sold by Customer in 
France (or anywhere else in the world), and the territorial limitation in 
the agreement between Patentee and Manufacturer does not prevent 
patent exhaustion. 
c. If the license agreement provides that Licensee may sell 
patented items but requires that Licensee impose post-sale 
restrictions upon his or her customers, subsequent transactions 
nevertheless can be sales which are not subject to those post-sale 
restrictions. 
Patentee licenses to Manufacturer the right to make, use, sell, and 
offer to sell items but requires Manufacturer to have its customers sign 
contracts restricting the use of the patented products. Manufacturer’s 
subsequent sale of patented item to Customer is authorized and 
triggers patent exhaustion even if Manufacturer neglected to have 
Customer sign contract restricting the use of the patented product. 
Manufacturer may have breached its contract with Patentee, and 
Patentee may sue for breach of contract; it may not, however, sue 
Manufacturer (or Customer) for patent infringement. Similarly, if 
Manufacturer had Customer sign a contract as required under 
Manufacturer’s agreement with Patentee, but Customer breached the 
contract, Manufacturer (and likely Patentee as third-party beneficiary) 
may sue Customer for breach of contract, but Patentee may not sue 
Customer for patent infringement. 
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d. If the license agreement permits Licensee to sublicense but 
does not permit the Licensee to sell the patented item, then 
subsequent transactions are not sales. 
If Patentee licenses to Manufacturer the right to sublicense, then 
Manufacturer’s subsequent transaction with Customer cannot be a sale 
and Customer’s use is limited to the terms of the sublicense because 
there was no authorized first sale. 
2.  Contractual Restrictions and Transactions Involving Copyright 
Software is at the heart of the license v. sale dilemma because in 
order to use it, the purchaser of the license must make a copy or 
distribution, and doing so implicates an exclusive right of the 
copyright holder. Someone who transfers previously used software to 
another party in violation of a “no transfer/no copying” provision may 
be liable for contributory copyright infringement because the use of 
that software necessarily requires copying the content a second time—
a right that a license containing a “no transfer/no copying” provision 
does not grant. By contrast, someone who transfers a copy of a 
tangible item, such as a book or painting, in violation of a “no 
transfer/no copying” provision does not infringe, because the 
transferee, despite such a provision, may use the tangible item in a way 
that does not infringe the copyright holder’s exclusive rights (such as 
by reading the book or viewing the painting, but not by making copies 
and distributing it). 
Streaming content and hosted content, however, are not sold; 
rather, access to the content is licensed and conditioned upon 
adherence to the host website’s terms of service. Yet, simply because 
digital content is licensed and not sold does not mean that every 
violation of the terms of service constitutes a copyright violation. 
Rather, only violations of those provisions upon which the license 
grant is conditioned constitute copyright infringement; violations of 
other provisions would be contractual breaches. As with software, a 
user who has already used a digital code could not then transfer the 
code to another user in violation of a “no transfer/no copying” clause 
because, although temporary, streamed content is still copied 
regardless of the type of violation (copyright infringement or 
contractual breach), and the terms of use typically grant the copyright 
holder (through the hosting service) the right to control and 
discontinue the user’s access to the content. If the terms of service 
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state that the copyright holder retains control, whether the violation is 
rooted in contract or copyright, the user’s ability to access content may 
be terminated. 
Contractual language may be used in copyright transactions in 
two different ways. First, it can demonstrate the licensor’s continuing 
control over the copyright item (which would indicate a license rather 
than a sale). Second, it can create a condition or a covenant, which 
determines whether the licensee’s act constitutes infringement or a 
contractual breach. 
Contract law requires that the parties use clear and unambiguous 
language to create an express condition.313 Courts will interpret 
ambiguous language as a promise rather than an express condition, 
especially if interpreting it as an express condition would result in a 
forfeiture.314 In order for contractual language to constitute a condition 
of the copyright license, it must implicate one of the exclusive 
statutory rights of the Licensor and be drafted clearly to indicate words 
of condition, such as provided that or the if . . . then duo. Contractual 
language can be helpful in characterizing a transaction as a license or 
a sale, even if it is not determinative. The following examples illustrate 
how a restriction should be interpreted in a software license 
agreement. These examples assume a negotiated agreement between 
businesses; provisions in adhesive form contacts should also meet the 
reasonable expectations test.315 
Example 1: 
“Licensor grants Licensee a non-exclusive, non-transferable 
license to make two copies, use, and display the Software on one 
device. This is a license and not a sale of the Software.” 
In the above, the language is not conditional, and the Licensee 
may sell the Software (and the license that accompanies it). Even 
though the language states that the license is “non-transferable,” 
 
 313. See Richard F. Kline, Inc. v. Shook Excavating & Hauling, Inc., 885 A.2d 381, 388 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 2005) (stating that if the language is doubtful, the language will be interpreted as a 
promise or constructive condition rather than an express condition). 
 314. Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon, & Co., 660 N.E.2d 415, 418 (N.Y. 
1995) (noting that “[t]his interpretive preference is especially strong when a finding of express 
condition would increase the risk of forfeiture”). 
 315. The lack of bargaining power underlies the unfairness of adhesive forms and may affect 
small businesses as well as consumers. See, e.g., Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining 
Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139, 141 (2005) (arguing that the legal conception of bargaining power 
is unrealistic and “systematically disadvantage[s] parties who do not fit within the courts’ 
traditional narratives of disempowerment”). 
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transferability is not one of the Licensor’s exclusive rights as a 
copyright owner, so it does not limit the scope of the license. Although 
the Licensee may sell the Software to Customer, the Licensee and 
Customer must not exceed the scope of the license. The sale is of the 
license to the software, not of the underlying intellectual property. If 
the Licensee sells the software, it cannot retain copies because the 
license is limited to the right to make two copies, and to use and 
display the Software on one device. 
Example 2: 
“Licensor grants Licensee a non-exclusive, non-transferable 
license to make two copies, use, and display the Software on one 
device. Licensee agrees to pay the fees listed on Schedule 1.” 
The language above creates a covenant. If Licensee sells the 
Software to Customer, Licensor may sue for breach of contract but not 
for infringement as long as the Licensee and Customer do not exceed 
the scope of the license.316 
Example 3: 
“Licensor grants Licensee a non-exclusive license to make two 
copies, use, and display the Software on one device provided that 
Licensee may not transfer, assign, or sell the Software to any party. 
The license grant is expressly conditioned upon Licensee’s 
compliance with this provision.” 
The clause contains words that signal a condition. Yet, a court 
may be reluctant to construe the language as creating a condition if 
doing so would result in a forfeiture of the Licensee’s rights under the 
agreement. The prohibition against transfers does not implicate one of 
the copyright holder’s exclusive rights, and thus, a violation of that 
provision cannot be considered an infringement. More importantly, 
unless the Licensor retains rights to control the software (e.g., remote 
control, right to terminate), the transaction should be characterized as 
sale, and not a license. The Licensee may transfer the software, but the 
transferee must abide by the terms of the license grant with respect to 
copying and displaying the software. 
Example 4: 
“Licensor grants Licensee a non-exclusive license to make two 
copies, use, and display the Software if and only so long as Licensee 
 
 316. This does not mean, however, that Licensor would prevail on a breach of contract claim. 
The Licensee could raise contract defenses, such as unconscionability. 
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does not transfer, assign or sell the Software to any party. The license 
grant is expressly conditioned upon Licensee’s compliance with this 
provision. If Licensee attempts to transfer, assign, or sell the Software, 
this license immediately terminates and is void.” 
In the above example, the intent of the parties to create a condition 
to the license is clear. Consequently, it might be much more difficult 
for a court to find a covenant rather than a condition in a negotiated 
agreement. However, to avoid a forfeiture, the transaction may still be 
characterized as a sale of the license if the Licensor does not retain 
rights to control the software. In that case, the prohibition against 
transferring should fail (similar to Example 3), although the transferee 
must abide by the terms of the license grant. 
Example 5: 
“Licensor grants Licensee a non-exclusive license to make two 
copies, use, and display the Software if and only if Licensee has paid 
the fees set forth in Schedule 1 within thirty days of the date of the 
invoice.” 
The intent of the parties is clearly to condition the license grant 
on payment of the license fee. There would be no forfeiture because 
the Licensee had not paid the license fees. Accordingly, failure to pay 
the license fees means the license grant is invalid and continued use 
by the Licensee will be considered infringement. 
C.  Visualizing the Methodology: Two Flow Charts 
The license v. sale quandary is complex because the analysis must 
run along two different axes. The first involves characterizing the 
transaction—is it a license or a sale? The second axis involves 
analyzing the nature and effect of the contractual terms—did it involve 
a contract or a covenant, meaning did the licensee infringe or breach? 
Each line of inquiry differs depending upon whether the transaction 
involves a patent or a copyright. There are, however, two caveats 
where the terms are contained in an adhesive standard form contract. 
First, the contract must be properly formed, which may be subject to 
dispute if the legal nature of the form is not reasonably communicated 
and the consumer has not actively and deliberately manifested 
consent. Second, even if the contract is properly formed, the terms 
should meet the reasonable expectations test. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Licensing goods—rather than selling them outright—was an 
important way for businesses to protect themselves from opportunistic 
buyers who took advantage of legal gaps to exploit new product 
offerings. To encourage innovation and allow businesses to reap the 
rewards from their investments, courts accepted the idea of licensing 
as a way to impose post-sale restrictions. In doing so, they accepted a 
watered-down version of assent for the purposes of contract 
formation.317 Today, businesses exploit the licensing model to impose 
onerous contractual terms and defeat reasonable expectations to use 
products. 
The license v. sale question looms over the IOT and the 
proliferation of goods that are both licensed and sold. The stew of 
judicial opinions and the different adhesive contracting forms portend 
doctrinal chaos. This Article proposes a way to resolve the license v. 
sale dilemma that considers the reasonable expectations of parties. The 
methodology is complex because the underlying issues are intertwined 
and involve multiple strands of law; however, it may help steer the 
case law toward a more unified and predictable approach and away 
from doctrinal incoherence. 
Some may argue that requiring adherents to standard form 
contracts to specifically assent to terms would undermine the 
efficiency of using standard forms. Yet, the benefits of transactional 
efficiency should not accrue to only one party.318 While both parties 
could potentially benefit from the use of adhesive standard forms, only 
the drafting entity benefits when the forms contain one-sided terms 
that take advantage of the other party. Imposing the standard of 
“reasonable expectations” upon standard form contracts preserves the 
efficiency of form contracts while imbuing it with fairness. 
Others might argue that having consumers specifically assent 
would not right the imbalance because businesses would continue to 
have more power to offer terms on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. 
 
 317. See Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Formation and the Entrenchment of Power, 41 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 175, 203 (2009) (noting that modern contract law makes contract formation “much 
easier”). Hart notes that because mutual assent is easy to establish, modern contract law suffers 
from the “process problem” that requires relying upon policing doctrines to bad bargains and so 
places “the burden . . . on the coerced party to prove that a contract term(s) is unreasonable using 
one or more of the expanded contract policing doctrines.” Id. at 202–12. 
 318. While some might argue that the use of standard forms results in lower prices for 
consumers, there is a dearth of evidence to support this claim. 
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Furthermore, consumers would likely not read even if they were 
forced to click more frequently. The purpose of a specific assent 
requirement, however, is not primarily to encourage consumers to read 
but to discourage businesses from imposing too many terms. Although 
bargaining parity and substantive fairness with standard forms may be 
unrealistic, introducing a transactional hurdle such as specific assent 
to certain terms—even if those terms remain unread—adds friction to 
the transaction and so negatively affects the consumer’s experience 
with the company and the company’s product or service. This negative 
experience diminishes the good will that the consumer has toward the 
company. The contracting experience becomes part of the product 
offering and can enhance or diminish a customer’s interaction with the 
business. In addition, it would increase the salience of the term and 
may result in increased competition; it may also attract the attention 
of regulators or lawmakers. The proposed methodology does not 
resolve the normative question whether businesses should be 
permitted to license rather than sell their goods and services. The 
normative question is a policy question that requires a broader 
discussion of incentives. However, a specific assent requirement 
aligns with the goals of contract law and forces companies to be more 
transparent about their intentions or suffer the consequences in terms 
of loss of customer good will and negative publicity. 
 
 
